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carbon energy initiatives in development. In making this argument, 
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1Summary
The relationships between energy and development are complex, compounded 
by increasingly differentiated situations amongst developing countries and 
within them. Moreover, the manner in which energy services are realised has 
consequences for our health, environment, wealth, and social relations. Two 
important issues currently preoccupying the realm of international development 
are enhancing energy access whilst simultaneously addressing climate change.
A recurring theme in studies and policies for energy and development is the role 
innovation can play in improving sustainable energy access. International climate 
change negotiations place an emphasis on low-carbon technology transfer, 
which perpetuates a long history of expectations about technology providing 
solutions to energy and development challenges. Whilst these expectations are 
not entirely unfounded, this history indicates that solving the many problems 
associated with the provision of energy services involves a more complex set 
of interdependent processes than ‘straightforward’ transfer of technology. And 
yet, international discussions are intensifying (once again) around innovation in 
the form of technology transfer; discussions that frame the issue, we argue, in 
terms of financing the flow of low-carbon technological hardware to developing 
countries. This ‘hardware and finance’ framing of low-carbon development has 
resulted in a limited number of general purpose policy instruments – such as 
the Clean Development Mechanism – that tend to neglect important details of 
how technology can be ‘transferred’ successfully and sustainably. Moreover, 
they seem to neglect the contestable purposes of low-carbon development more 
broadly and the limited, though vital, roles technology transfer plays therein. 
Given the diversity of situations and concerns in energy and development, such a 
generalised yet narrow framing of the challenge could prove problematic.
Drawing upon the history of technology transfer, and discussing the record of the 
Clean Development Mechanism, this paper questions just how much the dominant 
‘hardware and finance’ framing will help communities explore and develop low-
carbon pathways that meet their needs. Our view is that a much broader and 
ambitions approach to energy and development is needed. We suggest a ‘socio-
technical transformation’ framework for organising low-carbon energy initiatives 
in development. In making this argument, we use a pathways approach to 
understanding the challenges of energy and development; an approach being 
developed by the STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex. Having argued for 
a broader and more plural perspective, we conclude the paper by suggesting a 
research agenda for testing its potential.
21. Introduction: purpose and argument of the paper
Improved energy services are an important underpinning for many development 
processes. Yet the relationships between energy and development are 
complex, compounded by increasingly differentiated situations amongst 
developing countries and within them: rural development and urban expansion; 
industrialisation; household energy needs; mobility; and whether the perspective 
is from the side of demand for energy services or supply of energy products. 
Moreover, the manner in which lighting, cooking, mobility, heating or cooling, 
information and communications, powering equipment, and so on are realised 
through energy services has consequences (positive and negative) for our 
health, environment, wealth, and social relations. Two important issues currently 
preoccupying the realm of international development are enhancing energy 
access whilst simultaneously addressing climate change.
A recurring theme in studies and policies for energy and development is the 
role innovation can play in improving sustainable energy access. International 
climate change negotiations place a particular emphasis on low-carbon 
technology transfer1, which perpetuates a long history of expectations about 
technology providing solutions to energy and development challenges. Whilst 
these expectations are not entirely unfounded, this history indicates that solving 
problems of energy access, equity, security, environment, and so on, involves a 
more complex set of interdependent processes than ‘straightforward’ transfer of 
technology. And yet, international discussions are intensifying (once again) around 
innovation in the form of technology transfer. Negotiations tend to frame the issue 
in terms of financing the flow of low-carbon technological hardware to developing 
countries. This is realised through a limited number of general purpose measures, 
such as the Global Environment Facility, the Clean Development Mechanism, 
and initiatives such as Advance Market Commitments. These measures, fixing 
on quite narrow issues of finance and hardware, tend to neglect important details 
of how technology can be ‘transferred’ successfully and sustainably. Moreover, 
they seem to neglect the contestable purposes of low-carbon development more 
broadly and the limited, though vital, roles technology transfer plays therein. 
Given the diversity of situations and concerns in energy and development, such a 
generalised yet narrow framing of the challenge could prove problematic.
1 We recognise that the term ‘technology transfer’ is a loaded one, carrying many assumptions 
about the process of technical change that are either highly contested or simply inaccurate. 
The term is used in this paper where it reflects the debate on technical change, whether in 
international negotiations or academic literature. Our own view is that we need to recast our 
thinking on technical change in developing countries and to reflect this in more appropriate 
terms such as ‘low-carbon innovation’.
3A number of assumptions behind current approaches are questionable. They do 
not yet adequately capture how a wide variety of other factors interact in complex, 
emergent ways in energy and development. Current discussions appear blind to 
lessons from a chequered history of energy ‘technology transfer’ going back to 
the 1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy and before. 
Drawing upon this and the broader history of technology transfer more generally, 
this paper questions just how much the dominant ‘hardware and finance’ framing 
will help communities explore and develop low-carbon pathways that meet their 
needs. 
Our view is that a much broader and ambitions approach to energy and 
development is needed. We suggest a ‘socio-technical transformation’ framework 
for organising low-carbon energy initiatives in development. In making this 
argument, we draw upon a pathways approach to understanding the challenges 
of energy and development, and whose methodology is being developed by 
the STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex (STEPS – Social, Technological 
and Environmental Pathways to Sustainability, see www.steps-centre.org). The 
pathways approach means attending to:
a) How contending narratives about energy challenges in low-carbon development 
are mobilised in concrete situations
b) How the political economy of those situations favours certain narratives
c) The ways both these processes influence the mobilisation of material and 
social resources in low-carbon innovation processes
d) What this means for the evolution of energy systems and low-carbon 
development pathways, particularly for alternative pathways that prioritise the 
needs of the poor and marginalised.
Having argued for a broader and more plural perspective, we conclude the paper 
by suggesting a research agenda for testing its potential. As such, this paper is 
aimed initially at researchers and users of low-carbon development research in 
policy, business and civil society.
Before entering this discussion and setting out our arguments, it is helpful to make 
explicit three of our guiding assumptions. First, we hold the view that developing 
countries need to be fostering indigenous capabilities for low-carbon innovation.2 
This rests on the notion that such capabilities enable developing countries to 
exercise greater control over the choices they can make in development, 
wherever such choices are relevant to their own priorities. We do not suggest 
2 We define indigenous innovation capabilities as the capabilities to adapt, develop, deploy 
and operate low carbon technologies effectively within specific developing country contexts 
(Ockwell et al. 2009).
4that all developing countries (or all countries, for that matter) need to cultivate 
the entire range of low-carbon innovation capabilities, merely that some of these 
capabilities will be necessary to achieve self-directed development as economies 
across the world attempt to decarbonise. 
Our second main assumption is that low-carbon development pathways need to 
be socially just. As such, we agree with the Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development, for which ‘over-riding priority’ must be given to the needs of the 
poor (WCED 1987: 43). One important aspect of this assumption is that any 
‘chosen’ pathway needs to be legitimate for poor and marginalised groups as well 
as delivering wider public goods; otherwise it is unlikely to provide sustainability 
benefits and may well be self-defeating. Our final guiding assumption is that 
climate change is real and increasingly immanent, and that it will impact on many 
developing countries disproportionately, if it has not already begun to do so.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we outline what we see 
as an increasing diversity of energy challenges in the context of low-carbon 
development (more information relating to this can be found in Annex A). Following 
this, in section 3, we give a brief discussion of the STEPS pathways approach to 
understanding this diversity of challenges. We apply this approach in section 4 to 
identify the currently dominant low-carbon development framing that understands 
the challenge to be one of technology and finance. This is further elaborated 
in section 5, using the example of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Section 6 discusses a range of insights that have emerged from ‘technology 
transfer’ literatures; insights that the dominant low-carbon development pathway 
appears unable to accommodate. Part of the reason for this inability to frame the 
challenge wider than technological hardware and finance, we argue, is rooted in a 
history of international political economy, and narrow understandings of technology 
and development (Annex B explores this history in more detail). In section 7, 
having made these arguments, we suggest that the challenges of low-carbon 
development could be more usefully framed – both analytically and normatively 
– by taking a socio-technical transitions approach. However, we do not claim 
that the transitions framing is without difficulties. Rather, we suggest that it offers 
a way to gather the many insights referred to in the paper – from the pathways 
approach and the ‘technology transfer’ literatures – and begin to integrate them. 
As such, section 8 sketches what emerges from all the discussions here to outline 
a research agenda for energy sustainability in development. Finally, in section 9, 
we draw the paper to a close with some conclusions.
52. Diverse energy challenges in low-
carbon development
The energy-development relationship is complex. There is heterogeneity among 
developing countries, a diversity of motivations and drivers of energy-development 
interdependencies, and inter-linkages among these motivations and drivers. The 
classification ‘developing countries’ belies an increasing differentiation: low-
income, middle-income, least developed, and highly-indebted poor countries; and 
emerging and transition economies. Energy and development are interdependent 
through many motivations and drivers, including rural development and urban 
expansion, industrialisation, household energy needs, mobility; and whether our 
perspective is the demand for energy services or the supply of energy products. 
Moreover, these motivations and drivers themselves are inter-linked. Rural 
development may involve agricultural production that requires energy inputs for 
farming and processing; the processed goods need to be transported to markets; 
and rural areas need supplies of other goods, manufactured equipment and 
services (including energy products and carriers) that also need to be transported. 
Domestic markets – rural and urban – may be important for industrialisation, so 
progress in rural and urban development will tend to raise domestic demand 
for energy. Annex A explores the energy situation in developing countries and 
provides background for the subsequent discussions. It underscores the need 
to understand the diversity and extent of the energy challenges that developing 
countries now face.
Taking households for example, families need energy for a variety of services, the 
most basic of which are lighting, thermal comfort and cooking. Lighting can be 
important to facilitate productive night-time activities such as children’s homework, 
of course, but also for immediate quality-of-life activities such as socialising. 
Different lighting technologies open up or close down various possibilities, whose 
meanings in terms of everyday life become entwined in those technologies. 
Technology studies scholars prefer to talk of socio-technical arrangements or 
configurations in order to capture the deeply social aspects of many technological 
artefacts.
Meanwhile, in the industrial sector, energy supply that is intermittent, unreliable or 
unstable can cause loss of production as well as raise costs, with implications for 
competitiveness. Again, the forms and reliability of energy systems have social 
and economic implications, and whose significance to key interests may have 
some bearing on the maintenance of those systems and whose energy needs are 
prioritised. These socio-technical points highlight that secure energy access is not 
only about the quantity of energy made available by technologies at a particular 
time for a particular service, but also its quality, predictability and versatility for 
different energy-development services. Moreover, the significance of the activities 
underpinned by energy gives the latter its real meaning in peoples’ lives and in 
6economic activity. These socio-economic aspects of energy can reinforce material 
requirements for energy when they become indispensable. The manufacturer’s 
need for stable electricity currents to power her sensitive production equipment 
suggest a different quality of energy security criteria compared to lighting the 
bulb in her home at night. The ability to power both these activities has wider 
implications for her standard of living and quality of life. In other words, energy is 
an intimate and influential thread in a web of socio-technical practices, and should 
be understood in these socio-technical terms (Shove 2003; Rip and Kemp 1998).
Governments in many countries recognise the strategic significance of energy, and 
have policies in place to maintain or enhance energy services. Non-governmental 
actors, of course, are also involved in building, maintaining and enhancing energy 
systems. As these systems evolve over time actors develop rules, procedures 
and specialised skills; they form associations, make investments and establish 
material infrastructure; they invest and seek returns through the expansion of 
markets; and consumers become familiar with particular lifestyle norms (or aspire 
to them), entrenching certain behaviours that are resistant to alternative practices. 
Together, these and other processes can be mutually reinforcing, resulting in 
dominant pathways of development that constrain or marginalise alternative 
choices (Smith et al. 2005).
An important new consideration in the meaning of energy internationally is climate 
change. It is high on policy agendas, and further complicates energy-development 
relationships. Conceptually, attempts to address climate change have been 
separated into mitigation and adaptation, although there may be solutions that 
are positive in both respects as well as some that impact positively on one but 
negatively on the other. For example, in adaptation, mechanical air conditioners 
may be used more widely in response to higher temperatures (and rising incomes) 
but this will raise energy demand (in contrast to, say, passive cooling in building 
design or clothing conventions). Conversely, responses to flooding can involve 
increased pumping of water, which also requires considerable energy. If energy 
is generated using carbon-intensive sources then mitigation will be undermined, 
further adaptations required, and so forth. 
Having said this, we will not discuss climate change science and impacts much 
further in this paper as we are more interested in responses to climate change 
in the context of development. Instead, we assume climate change is a physical 
reality – largely caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from 
human activity – that will have disproportionately serious impacts in developing 
countries for many decades to come. Globally, we need to stabilise within the 
next few decades the total GHGs in the atmosphere in order to lower the risk 
of dangerous climate change. One of the more important ways in which we can 
achieve this stabilisation is to dramatically reduce GHG emissions associated 
with human activities, and to do so urgently. Energy-use is implicated significantly 
in this challenge because much of our demand for energy is currently met by the 
combustion of energy carriers that emit CO2 (carbon dioxide) in their exhaust 
7gases. The challenge is intensified because we expect global energy demand to 
continue to rise in tandem with development and economic growth, both of which 
are particularly important ambitions in developing countries.
Notwithstanding our points about the socially constructed meaning of energy, 
how we generate, convert, transport and use energy are all processes in 
which technology still plays an important role. This is so whether we are using 
sophisticated hardware such as photovoltaic modules or simple techniques such 
as burning biomass. No technology can solve problems perfectly and some have 
(good and bad) unintended impacts. But each energy technology is a tool that 
can help us service needs and wants in ways that (we hope) may be convenient, 
productive, affordable, safe and sustainable. The record of safety and sustainability 
of energy technologies in the industrialised economies is somewhat chequered. 
For developing countries, the record is considerably more uneven across many 
criteria. Of course, each criterion can be unpacked: it may be convenient to drive 
but roads become congested, need more costly maintenance and repair, the risk of 
accidents increases, and GHG emissions grow. A technology may raise individual 
productivity, but at what social cost and to whom elsewhere? The distributional 
contours of sustainability (beyond general normative principles like Brundtland) 
can be defined in different ways by and for various groups (Jacobs 1999). It might, 
for instance, be the generation and trade in carbon emission reduction credits 
that are deemed important, since they create revenues from offsetting the carbon 
emissions arising from wealth-generating activities elsewhere. Or sustainability 
might be understood as requiring more immediate and wider development gains 
locally from any given energy project. Of course, the former may help the latter. 
Sustainability involves a perpetual, reflexive linking and trading off of different 
environment-society-economy relations.
Box 1 illustrates the importance of taking a socio-technical perspective on 
alternative technologies in the case of biofuels, where the practical particulars 
have an important bearing on the sustainability features of development.
However, our purpose here is not to evaluate different energy sustainabilities. Even 
the priorities for poverty reduction and social justice in the pathways approach 
below can be met in a number of ways. Rather, our purpose is to point out that 
different sustainability concerns intersect with, and are variously taken up by, 
other issues and interests. These processes for mobilising different sustainability 
values work to frame development pathways and inform governance strategies 
for promoting some pathways over others, or for contesting them. With this brief 
characterisation of the multi-faceted energy-development challenge in mind, we 
introduce the pathways approach.
8Box 1: Biofuels and the complexities of sustainability in energy-development 
relationships
Biofuels are energy carriers that exemplify the potential for both positive and 
negative impacts on, and by, rural development and industrialisation, as well as 
demonstrating the complexities of the relationships between the two endeavours. 
The growing of biofuel crops could mean significant income for farmers, the 
processing of biofuel feedstocks could mean the development of important 
technological capabilities that offer opportunities for industrialisation (and beyond 
the immediate needs of the biofuels industry, but for similar processing industries), 
and biofuels may become an important low-carbon source of energy to mitigate 
climate change. For these reasons, amongst others, there have been periods of 
enthusiastic international support for biofuels from both industrialised countries 
and the developing world (e.g. in the 1980s and in the 2000s). For industrialised 
countries, biofuels have been seen as a means to reduce the climate change 
impacts of energy-hungry lifestyles with minimal disruption to those lifestyles 
(Dauvergne and Neville 2009). For developing countries, they have been seen as 
a means to generate income, reduce oil-dependency and meet the rising energy 
needs of economic growth (Sulle and Nelson 2009).
However, numerous uncertainties over whether biofuels will have positive 
or negative effects have also emerged periodically (often shortly after the 
enthusiasm). Most recently, this has included the ‘food riots’ (or ‘fuel riots’, 
depending on the perspective taken) of 2007/8 (Dauvergne and Neville 2009). 
These uncertainties span the range of economic, environmental and social 
dimensions of sustainability. Economically, biofuel production has been long-
supported by government subsidies, particularly in the US, encouraging the 
displacement of food crops in favour of biofuel feedstocks and raising the price 
of food. Environmentally, there are serious concerns that some biofuels will add 
to GHG emissions, and that there could be many direct negative impacts in 
developing countries. One of the more obvious of these is increased pressure 
for deforestation to clear land for large-scale production of biofuel crops. 
Socially, there is growing concern that the poor in developing countries will be 
further marginalised as large companies turn ‘common’ land over to commercial 
production, depriving the poor of their livelihoods. Furthermore, there is some 
indication that land grabs mean even the economic benefits of biofuels will not 
be realised by the least developed countries. Dauvernge and Neville (2009), for 
example, analyse how richer developing countries are beginning to exploit poorer 
countries as sources of cheap feedstock extraction, in similar ways to the historic 
extraction of minerals and other resources by industrialised countries.
None of these outcomes is either certain or unchangeable. The point here is to 
illustrate that there are many complexities in energy-development relationships 
beyond the technique of turning biomass into fuel, and that we need to be 
able to unpick carefully if we are not to create more problems than we solve. 
These complexities co-evolve on many dimensions: social, ecological, technical, 
9political. Our use of the term socio-technical is intended to capture, in shorthand, 
these multiple dimensions.
3. A pathways approach to understanding 
energy challenges
The starting point for the pathways approach is to recognise that energy services 
in any particular setting comprise complex systems of social, technological and 
environmental components interacting across multiple scales. These components 
co-evolve over time, which means that systems of energy service tend to develop 
along path-dependent trajectories. The previous section indicated that energy 
practices are the emergent outcome of complex, intimate and evolving relations 
between technologies, institutions, markets and people. The processes that result 
in a meaningful energy service operate across overlapping and temporally distinct 
scales. This includes the routines of daily life intersecting with the turnover of 
energy-using goods, equipment and infrastructure.
The pathways approach recognises this, but is reflexive in the way it does so. 
This means recognising that there are many ways of ‘framing’ (i.e. bounding 
and understanding) any given energy system. Reflexivity means considering the 
ways in which different groups of actors ‘frame’ the complex energy system under 
consideration (including our own analytical framing) (Schön and Rein 1994). 
These framings inform generic narratives that guide both analysis and action. A 
framing will delimit the energy system boundaries, and privilege certain dynamics, 
functions and outcomes, but which all remain open to different interpretations 
under contrasting framings. 
“Narratives are created and promoted by particular actors, networks and 
institutions. They often start with a particular framing of a system and its 
dynamics, and suggest particular ways in which these should develop or 
transform to bring about a particular set of outcomes. Narratives therefore 
suggest and justify particular kinds of action, strategy and intervention. 
Some narratives, in turn, come to be supported by institutional and political 
processes – governance – so as to define and shape pathways: particular 
directions in which interacting social, technological and environmental 
systems co-evolve over time. Other narratives, meanwhile, may not 
become manifested in actual pathways of intervention and change, 
remaining marginalised.” (Leach et al. 2010: 371).
Energy system framings inform the strategies pursued for governing that system. 
The more persuasive a framing (and the more influential its advocates), the more 
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in tune it is with powerful perspectives on reality; and the greater the interests it 
mobilises, then the more likely it is to enrol support for its strategies, and become 
institutionalised into the energy system, thereby becoming part of the reproduction 
of the system. As we shall see, international negotiations over climate change 
frame the development of low-carbon energy services chiefly as a question of 
financing the transfer of low-carbon technologies. This narrative has implications 
for the forms and distribution of low-carbon development around the world (see 
sections 4 and 5).
To the extent that the outcomes of any action confirm, legitimise and reinforce a 
framing, then a mutual correspondence between the pathway and the framing will 
persist. To the extent that outcomes confound expectations, then the narratives 
justifying that framing will need to work hard to maintain legitimacy, or be revised, 
or be replaced.
Outcomes that confound expectations under the framing that informed an activity 
can open space for alternative narratives to be heard more attentively, thereby 
raising the salience of those alternative framings of the energy system. There 
might be processes beyond the frame of the dominant narrative, such as the 
importance of hard won indigenous capabilities for successful technology transfer, 
and whose absence (within the framing and associated governance strategies) 
account for problems along the pathway being pursued. These processes can 
work to expand the frame, broaden the actions, and enrich the governance of the 
development pathway. The history and scholarship around technology transfer 
in industrialisation, for instance, offers a broader set of insightful contributions to 
international negotiations and mechanisms for low-carbon development. We pick 
this up in section 6.
At times, however, there can be more fundamental challenges that cannot be 
accommodated within a dominant frame, and which demand a complete re-
orientation of framings and pathways. Persistent difficulties in achieving deeply 
decarbonised development outcomes might be an example here; especially when 
existing approaches are working well on their own terms (e.g. cheap energy 
supplies through competitive markets), yet do not deliver sufficient emissions 
reductions, or neglect other important dimensions to sustainability, such as equity. 
Under such circumstances, a need for a more radical re-framing might become 
accepted more widely; again opening space for alternatives to have some 
influence over governance strategies and outcomes.
“Building pathways to sustainability must involve recognising and 
addressing the power-laden interplay between pathways. This includes 
being explicit about conflicts and trade-offs between them, as well as areas 
where there is scope for complementarity, alignment and integration. It 
includes challenging pressures that enable certain pathways to remain 
dominant to the exclusion of others. And it involves actively highlighting 
and building political and institutional support for less dominant alternative 
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pathways, including those that address the full range and implications of 
dynamics, and which support the goals of particular marginalised groups.” 
(Leach et al. 2010: 376)
Consequently, a pathways approach is open about the unavoidably normative 
and plural implications of any energy and development analysis and action. It 
involves a pragmatic awareness of the limits, as well as the advantages, arising 
from the situated and partial characterisation of any given framing. We argue that 
a broader framing than technology transfer is required in international negotiations 
for energy and low-carbon development. Such a framing must be capable of 
recognising and supporting a plurality of environmentally sustainable and socially 
just development pathways appropriate to specific situations. Negotiations over 
the financing and administration of technology transfer are certainly helpful to 
some low-carbon development situations. But other development situations 
are less susceptible to these measures as currently constituted, and are being 
neglected as a result. Criticisms of the CDM reported in section 5 illustrate this 
problem. Indeed, there is a risk that these neglected sites, with legitimate and 
desperate needs for development, and in the absence of low-carbon capability 
building, will turn to well-known carbon intense energy solutions, which are more 
institutionalised in the international trade of technology, and thereby ‘readier’ 
to implement. The risk here is that communities ‘relieved’ of carbon reduction 
commitments over the medium term become locked into more carbon intense 
trajectories, and that these store up problems for future changes of direction. 
Carbon intense energy pathways remain likely in the absence of effective low-
carbon development policies and locally meaningful and powerful alternative 
pathways.
There is a rich research literature that identifies important social processes and 
outcomes necessary for innovations to move and embed in different contexts, 
including those beyond the technology-and-finance frame. We contend, 
moreover, that even a broader technology transfer framing, cognisant of these 
processes, may not be sufficient to deliver radically decarbonised development. 
This is because the challenge, as we see it, is not simply to embed lower-carbon 
technologies in diverse contexts, but to transform those contexts and engender 
self-reinforcing low-carbon development pathways. ‘Contexts’ have to be 
unpacked and endogenised within the analysis; they need to be considered as 
part of the transformation process with which policy support must engage. 
Low-carbon development is not simply a more carbon efficient reform of existing 
(technological) trajectories. Whether it is emerging economies or desperately poor 
communities, the conventional view of technology and development, which largely 
involves firms catching up with the technological frontiers, may not be the best 
route to sustainability anyway (Berkhout et al. 2009). Highly novel sustainability 
innovations can arise in a variety of settings, and involve actors beyond firms, in 
both public and civil society arenas, as well as operating through international 
networks. The whole notion of what gets transferred, from where, by whom, and 
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for whom, looks increasingly problematic. Rather, low-carbon development has 
to involve the creation of new development pathways, and therefore policies to 
support low-carbon development have to include the capabilities and resources 
for communities to realise their goals sustainably. Our claim is that international 
negotiations need to reframe their debate in terms of seeking transitions to low-
carbon energy practices across diverse development pathways. 
Before introducing our reframing of energy challenges in low-carbon development, 
we elaborate some of our criticisms of how current international approaches 
frame the challenge. This also serves to illustrate the pathways approach to 
understanding the challenges. The next section discusses how international policy 
negotiations have tended to frame their energy and development discussions. 
These narrow down around questions of finance and hardware. This orientates 
governance strategies, activities and outcomes along particular pathways whose 
distribution and diversity is suspect. We illustrate these characteristic pathways 
with the case of the CDM in section 5.
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4. The technology and finance framing of the challenges
In this section we focus on the dominant pathway for energy and development 
being pursued at the international level. This dominant pathway focuses on 
technology transfer and finance, and constitutes an enduring and influential framing 
of energy and development issues. Technology certainly plays an important role 
in the provision of the energy services that underpin development processes. 
Historically, energy technologies have tended to be designed and manufactured 
in the industrialised economies. As a result, the developing countries have been 
pre-occupied with gaining access to these technologies through development 
assistance. Since the early 1960s, several institutions have been created – 
multilateral and bilateral – to help developing countries in terms of science and 
technology in general and, since the 1980s, in energy technology in particular. 
Annex B traces this history, which was dominated by arguments between the 
industrialised and developing countries over technology and finance, especially 
as played out in international forums. This history is important for understanding 
the way in which ‘technology transfer’ – as it is usually called – became highly 
politicised and for understanding the emergence of the CDM and market-based 
approaches to low-carbon development, as well as the reasons for the current 
impasse in negotiations over the climate regime. 
Many of the current and proposed arrangements for financing low-carbon 
development (conceived principally as an issue of technology transfer) are 
discussed in Annex B. Donor countries tend to have their own bilateral agencies 
that include some form of technical assistance but our discussion here (and in 
Annex B) focuses on those institutions that are multilateral. In part, this is to 
simplify the discussion but also it is in the multilateral institutions that we can see 
most clearly the negotiations over technology access and how to improve it. There 
has been or continues to be the Energy Assessment Programme (EAP), Energy 
Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP), Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Climate Investment 
Fund (CIF), and possibilities of using Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) and 
a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. Each has different motives and forms 
of engagement, but all except ESMAP and the GEF (to some extent) emphasise 
finance for ‘technology transfer’.
The GEF works through both the World Bank and the UN systems, and involves 
innovative financial arrangements (World Bank) as well as attempts to disseminate 
technological hardware through projects (the UN). The CDM is entirely a finance 
instrument, overseen by the UNFCCC. The CIF is also a finance instrument that 
is currently with the World Bank but includes a committee of bilateral development 
agencies, developing-country representatives and civil society observers. AMCs 
are a topic of discussion at the time of writing (June 2011). These would provide 
a form of finance for risky technologies but are not yet in operation, although 
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DFID (UK Department for International Development) has shown a keen interest 
in deploying them in the near future. The Copenhagen Fund was only agreed in 
principle at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009. There is no 
space to provide detailed discussions of each of these modalities. However, most 
arise in the course of our discussion in Annex B on the history of international 
negotiations over technical assistance.
Later we elaborate upon one of the most successful of them to date (in terms of 
finance deployed) – the CDM. But, just how much finance is at stake? Various 
estimates for the amount of finance necessary to meet the climate challenge in 
developing countries have been suggested. Stern (2007), for example, estimates 
the figure to be USD 300 billion per annum. While investments in sustainable 
energies worldwide have been increasing rapidly in recent years, there is still 
a long way to go before they reach the requisite levels in developing countries. 
Figure 1 shows estimated world investments in sustainable energies (low-carbon 
technologies and energy efficiency) between 2002 and 2009, with a projection 
for worldwide investments in 2010 (PCT 2010). These are disaggregated into 
an approximate developing-country group and registered CDM projects, in order 
to compare the levels of finance with worldwide investments. The ‘developing-
country’ group actually includes some of the richer countries 3 and so overstates 
the levels of finance to developing countries, and is likely to include the CDM 
(although it is not clear whether this would be registered projects only or include 
those further upstream in the CDM pipeline). However, the point here is to examine 
indicative figures rather than to perform statistical analysis, so the accuracy of the 
numbers is not critical to our needs.
 
3 The figures are from the UNEP and NEF (2009) report in which the world is divided into the 
following regions: Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Oceania, and the Middle 
East and Africa. The ‘developing countries’ shown in the charts (Figure 1 and Figure 2) are 
comprised of these regions excluding Europe and North America.
15
Figure 1: Estimated investments in low-carbon energy technologies, 2002 to 
2010; comparing developing countries, the CDM, and the world.
Source: UNEP and NEF (2009), UNEP Risø (2010), pct (2010)
Some disaggregation for 2008 of the developing-country group is possible with 
the data given in UNEP and NEF (2009). This is shown in Figure 2 as a pie chart 
and clearly displays a heavy bias towards just three countries: China, Brazil and 
India.
This bias is reflected in the CDM (see section 5); indeed it is even more skewed. 
Figure 3 shows the accumulated investments made through the CDM since 2005, 
based on registered projects only. China has received over 70% of the finance 
available so far, while India has been the next best beneficiary with 13.5% of 
the investments. Brazil has received 1.4%, leaving the rest of the participating 
countries with 13.6% among them.
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Figure 2: Sustainable energy investments in developing countries, 2008.
Source: UNEP and NEW (2009)
Key
Country, USD billion, percentage
ROW: Rest of the world
Figure 3: CDM registered projects and accumulated investment value, as at 
end of May 2011.
Source: UNEP Risø (2011)
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Based on the figures given in UNEP and NEF (2009) for the developing-country 
group, the rate of growth of investments in low-carbon technologies in developing 
countries will need to be about 18% per year in order to reach the suggested level 
of USD 300 billion by 2020. 
Questions about whether such growth in finance is achievable over an extended 
period, and how investments are going to be administered (e.g. if they include a 
significant amount of multilateral aid and/or work through a CDM-like framework) 
are the subject of intense debate in international forums. There has been some 
movement in recent years but there is still a long way to go.
Important as these financing and administrative debates are, they tend to miss the 
point because they remain within a technology and finance framework. Experience 
with other pathways should make us reflect on just how much technology and 
finance will assist widespread and deep low-carbon development (in contrast to 
just the accumulation of low-carbon hardware in countries or regions capable of 
absorbing those technologies). As we explore in the next two sections, to the extent 
that technology can assist in development, theories of ‘technology transfer’ and 
development have become more sophisticated over time, but practice has been 
highly uneven – geographically and temporally. Moreover, whilst predominantly 
market-framed approaches to technology transfer continue to dominate, it is 
important to not let interest in technology flows overshadow other aspects of low-
carbon development. There is a risk that the relatively narrow and static framing 
of the challenges into a question of re-distributing low-carbon technology actually 
fails to address how communities can develop greater control over their own low-
carbon pathways. We see this in the case of the CDM, which epitomises the 
technology and finance framing.
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5. Technology-finance pathways: the 
Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows signatories to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change to trade in carbon emission reductions. 
An instrument of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM began operation in 2005 as a 
way to combine the desire of industrialised countries for economically efficient 
emissions reductions with the need in developing countries for sustainable 
economic growth and development. The mechanism allows developers to finance 
projects in developing countries that are low-carbon and ‘additional’ (meaning 
that they would not have been financed without the CDM). The CO2e emissions4 
saved are then converted into Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) that can 
be traded on the international market such as in the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS). Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries (the industrialised world) 
can use the CERs to help them meet their Kyoto targets while, in principle, 
non-Annex I countries (the developing world) receive investments that support 
their sustainable development. Although the CDM does not explicitly mandate 
‘technology transfer’, it has become an important mechanism for investments in 
technological hardware in (some) developing countries.
Our argument in this section is that, in its effect, the technology and finance framing 
underpinning the CDM privileges certain pathways over others. Those privileged 
pathways are located in places with sufficient absorptive capacity to host low-
carbon energy projects, and the projects themselves are limited to technologies 
that are already sufficiently developed for the profitable generation of certificates 
of emission reduction. These pathways do not do much for the development of 
low-carbon innovative capabilities in other settings, nor for the improvement of a 
wider portfolio of appropriate technologies. Those exceptional CDM projects that 
do manage to seed local innovative benefits underscore the weaknesses inherent 
in the more general pattern.
CDM-related pathways suffer from two interrelated difficulties. First, similarly 
to the technology and finance framing more generally, the CDM exploits static 
comparative advantages rather than building dynamic capabilities capable of 
transforming local contexts for development. Second, there remains a simplistic 
understanding of technology that has two effects: one, the focus turns to finance 
and hardware flows; and, two, learning and capabilities are under-supported 
in the mechanism. The two main arguments combine when we see that the 
participation of a few countries and use of just a few technologies means there is 
a lack of diversity from which to generate rich learning opportunities. Without such 
4 CO2e emissions (carbon dioxide equivalent emissions) include all greenhouse gases 
under one measure by referring to the equivalent carbon dioxide impact each gas has on 
the climate.
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learning, it is likely that the co-benefits claimed of the CDM will not materialise. To 
increase the chances of realising co-benefits (environmental and social), it seems 
that national policy plays an important role (Disch 2010).
Figure 4: Number of registered CDM projects as of the end of May 2011, 
disaggregated by projects type (3145 total registed projects).
Source: UNEP Risø (2011)
As a market mechanism, the CDM creates incentives for firms to invest in low-
carbon projects that are least-cost and/or will produce the highest returns through 
the sale of emissions credits. As such, ‘mature’ technologies, large-scale projects 
and low-risk investment environments tend to be the most attractive. Looking 
at the state of investments to date, we have already seen the bias towards a 
few countries – mainly China – but there is also a bias towards a small range 
of technologies. Figure 4 shows the number of registered projects by type, 
demonstrating clearly that the majority of projects are implemented using a small 
number of different technologies.
When examined in percentage terms, we can see that over 80% of the registered 
CDM projects are implemented using just five types of technology, only one of 
which could be considered a new renewable energy technology – wind – although 
mature relative to other new renewables. Apart from these technologies being 
mature – and therefore less risky – another explanation for the preponderance 
of them in the CDM portfolio could be that the methodologies needed for other 
technologies were not available until later and so prevented investments in them. 
However, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the numbers of projects at validation since 
2004 (Figure 5 shows the top nine project types and Figure 6 the rest). No obvious 
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pattern suggesting any methodology bottleneck is apparent in these figures. So, 
although we might expect some of the explanation for the clear bias in chosen 
technology types to be due to unavailable methodologies, the main reason is 
likely to be one of technology-maturity.
 
Figure 5: CDM projects at validation over time, disaggregated by project type 
(top nine types).
Source: UNEP Risø (2010)
In general, this preference for just a few project types is reflected in the total 
capacity that might be installed through the CDM. Figure 7 shows the potential 
installed capacity of all projects (for which power is a meaningful measure) 
disaggregated by type. These are not only registered projects but include those 
at validation and those awaiting registration. Finally, there is a dominance of large 
projects in the CDM portfolio. Figure 8 shows average project size by type, and 
average size of all projects.
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In general, this preference for just a few project types is reflected in the total capacity that might 
be installed through the CDM. Figure 7 shows the potential installed capacity of all projects (for 
which power is a meaningful measure) disaggregated by type. These are not only registered 
projects but include those at validation and those awaiting registration. Finally, there is a 
dominance of large projects in the CDM portfolio. Figure 8 shows average project size by type, 
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It should be clear from this brief description of the CDM portfolio that, while we need to be 
careful not to over-interpret project distributions, there are strong biases that result directly from 
the desire among the industrialised nations for economically efficient carbon reductions – the 
main determinant for the form the mechanism has taken. The significance of these biases is that 
diversity is being constrained – in terms of contexts where low-carbon technologies are being 
deployed, and in terms of the kinds of technologies being developed. In the short-term, there are 
benefits of both a public and private nature. Global public goods benefits derive from (cheaper) 
climate change mitigation, but the private gains are likely to be skewed in favour of 
industrialised-country firms. In other words, the CDM reinforces static comparative advantages. 
It is not transforming local contexts in a way that makes a broadening geography of locations 
attractive for low-carbon investment.  
Consequently, the least-developed countries risk being marginalised. At worse, they may even be 
left with little option but to establish carbon-intensive development pathways. In the long-term, 
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Figure 6: CDM projects at validation over time, disaggregated by project type 
(other 16 types).
Source: UNEP Risø (2010) 
It should be clear from this brief description of the CDM portfolio that, while we 
need to be careful not to over-interpret project distributions, there are strong 
biases that result directly from the desire among the industrialised nations for 
economically efficient carbon reductions – the main determinant for the form the 
mechanism has taken. The significance of these biases is that diversity is being 
constrained – in terms of contexts where low-carbon technologies are being 
deployed, and in terms of the kinds of technologies being developed. In the short-
term, there are benefits of both a public and private nature. Global public goods 
benefits derive from (cheaper) climate change mitigation, but the private gains 
are likely to be skewed in favour of industrialised-country firms. In other words, 
the CDM reinforces static comparative advantages. It is not transforming local 
contexts in a way that makes a broadening geography of locations attractive for 
low-carbon investment. 
Consequently, the least-developed countries risk being marginalised. At 
worse, they may even be left with little option but to establish carbon-intensive 
development pathways. In the long-term, there may be little absorptive capacity 
for low-carbon technologies in these countries. As the need to mitigate climate 
change becomes increasingly urgent, low-carbon technologies may be imposed 
on the least-developed countries, undermining the hard-won development gains, 
and good development practice, of recent years. Moreover, with low absorptive 
capacity, there is a high likelihood that low-carbon technologies will fail in the 
least-developed countries, undermining climate change mitigation also. This is 
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where the first critique is interrelated with our second critique of the CDM, an 
argument to which we now turn.
Figure 7: Total CDM project capacity by type (GW).
Source: UNEP Risø (2011)
Note a: Total capacity refers to all CDM projects for which power capacity is  
 meaningful. These include projects at validation, those awaiting  
 registration and those already registered. Ten project types are not  
 classifiable using power as the measure: N20, HFCs, Cement,   
 Forests,  EE households, PFCs and SF6, EE service, Transport,  
 Energy distribution, and CO2 capture. 
A second critique of the CDM concerns the extent to which it fosters learning and 
the accumulation of technological capabilities, from which development can be 
enhanced. The critique stems from the observation that the current form of the 
CDM is fundamentally influenced by the narrow understanding of technology as 
hardware, although it accepts the need for some supporting ‘software’ (mainly, 
operation and maintenance skills). However, that supporting software, it is 
assumed, can be transferred with relative ease along with the hardware. This narrow 
view of technology partially explains the dominance of finance in international 
negotiations although, as Young (2002) discusses in relation to the GEF, it is also 
about maximising aid flows. Of course, finance is important, as without it there 
would be no acquisition of hardware. But, just buying equipment is not necessarily 
enough to realise ‘technology transfer’ in any deep sense of the term, and is far 
from our notion of low-carbon innovation let alone socio-technical transformation. 
As we discuss below, the literature on technological capabilities shows that the 
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degree to which absorptive capacity exists in the ‘recipient’ country (or sector) 
is an important determinant of the success of ‘transfer’. If absorptive capacity 
is low then it is difficult to adopt (and adapt, develop, design) new technological 
hardware; and to create the skills, knowledge, organisational changes, and 
institutional arrangements and linkages necessary to facilitate its sustainability. 
Even if absorptive capacity is high, it takes effort to adopt a new technology: that 
is, processes of learning must take place. In a context of low absorptive capacity, 
learning is much more difficult and so requires additional support (for example, 
longer-term training, subsidies to lower risk, complementary policies, and so on). 
None of this is included in the present form of the CDM, and few studies of the 
mechanism appear even to recognise the problem. Indeed, many studies of the 
CDM seem to be exclusively concerned with how much ‘technology’ is being 
‘transferred’ from industrialised (or foreign) to developing countries, paying little 
or no attention to what this really means. An examination of the methodologies 
of a handful of studies reveals this preoccupation with technology transactions 
from which questionable inferences are made about ‘technology transfer’ (e.g. De 
Coninck et al. 2007; Seres et al. 2007; Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008; Schneider et 
al. 2008; Seres and Haites 2008).
Figure 8: Average CDM project size (MW). All projects are included, where 
power is used as a measure of size those at validation, awaiting registration and 
those already registered.
Source: UNEP Risø (2011)
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for some supporting ‘software’ (mainly, operation and maintenance skills). However, that 
supporting software, it is assumed, can be transferred with relative ease along with the hardware. 
This narrow view of technology partially explains the dominance of finance in international 
negotiations although, as Young (2002) discusses in relation to the GEF, it is also about 
maximising aid flows. Of course, finance is important, as without it there would be no 
acquisition of hardware. But, just buying equipment is not necessarily enough to realise 
‘t chnology transfer’ in any deep sense of th  term, and is far from our notion of low-carbon 
innovation let alone socio-technical transformation. As we discuss below, the literature on 
technological capabilities sh ws that the degree to which absorptive capacity exists in the 
‘recipient’ country (or sector) is an important determinant of the success of ‘transfer’. If 
absorptive capacity is low then it is difficult to adopt (and adapt, develop, design) new 
technological hardware; and to create the skills, knowledge, organisational changes, and 
institutional arrangements and linkages necessary to facilitate its sustainability. Even if absorptive 
capacity is high, it takes effort to adopt a new technology: that is, processes of learning must take 
place. In a context of low absorptive capacity, learning is much more difficult and so requires 
additional support (for example, longer-term training, subsidies to lower risk, complementary 
policies, and so on). None of this is included in the present form of the CDM, and few studies of 
the mechanism appear even to recognise the problem. Indeed, many studies of the CDM seem 
to be exclusively concerned with how much ‘technology’ is being ‘transferred’ from industrialised 
(or foreign) to developing countries, paying little or no attention to what this really means. An 
examination of the methodologies of a handful of studies reveals this preoccupation with 
technology transactions from which questionable inferences are made about ‘technology transfer’ 
(e.g. De Coninck et al. 2007; Seres et al. 2007; Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008; Schneider et al. 2008; 
Seres and Haites 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average CDM project size (MW). All projects are included, where power is us d as a measure 
of size: those at validation, awaiting registration and those already registered. 
Source: UNEP Risø (2011) 
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Two recent studies, however, use methodologies that are more sensitive to 
actual development outcomes. Doranova (2009) extends well beyond a review 
of Project Design Documents (PDDs) in the CDM to include a survey of project-
implementing companies, and makes use of science and technology indicators of 
host countries to incorporate absorptive capacity into the analysis. The research 
analyses projects registered by the end of January 2007 (497 projects in 41 
countries). The survey, which attempts to capture progress on technological 
capability building, is focused on companies in four countries5 giving a final 
sample size of 104 companies. Findings of the study include: 52% of projects 
use locally-sourced technology and expertise, 19% use foreign sources and 
22% use a combination; and foreign participation tends to be in larger projects 
(perhaps because of higher returns in terms of carbon credits). It also finds that, 
where technological hardware is sourced from elsewhere, local capabilities are 
important for its absorption. Once technological hardware has been acquired, 
there are processes of learning-by-doing that depend for their success on this 
absorptive capacity. Learning, however, is highest in operational capabilities, is 
lower for process improvement capabilities and lower still for the more advanced 
design and development capabilities (Doranova 2009: 40, 142). One other finding 
concerns the role of national policy in relation to technological learning. Across 
all three types of technological capability (operational, process improvement, and 
innovative) the analysis finds that national policy has some positive statistical 
significance in determining technological capability building (Doranova 2009: 
130).
Disch (2010) concentrates on the so-called “development dividend” claimed for 
the CDM, using PDDs supplemented with primary data from the websites of 
Designated National Authorities (DNAs) administering the CDM process. These 
data are then analysed using 15 indicators that are intended to describe the 
environmental, economic and social dimensions of sustainable development. As a 
consequence, and considering the large number of criteria, the study is focused on 
just six countries6 (although it investigates 122 PDDs). Perhaps the most important 
conclusion it draws is that the main co-benefit of the CDM is job-creation. In 
general, other benefits are usually weak or non-existent. The exceptional country 
in this regard is Peru, which has an unusual project assessment procedure that 
is highly pro-active. That is, the Peruvian DNA engages local stakeholders at the 
design stage of a project and makes on-site visits during the assessment phase 
rather than confine itself to a desk-based study only. The result appears to be a 
much higher quality CDM project portfolio than in other countries, with more co-
benefits than those found elsewhere.
5 The countries selected are Brazil, China, India and Mexico, accounting for over 70% of 
projects implemented and generating an initial sample size of 361 companies. The response 
rate of 28.8% results in a final sample size of 104 (Doranova 2009: 23).
6 These are China, India, Brazil, Peru, Malaysia and South Africa (Disch 2010: 53).
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The upshot of all this is that we know very little about the development outcomes 
from technology transfer in the CDM, although there is an indication that some 
does occur and a little is relatively deep. What is clear is that, for many, ‘technology 
transfer’ still means the acquisition of hardware and how much it costs. In the case 
of the CDM, the priority is on economically efficient emissions reductions, with an 
assumption – or simply a hope – that transfer of technology will take place. As a 
result, we have many studies that measure variables such as number and type of 
projects, country of origin of technological hardware, and CERs issued. Very few 
studies assess the more qualitative aspects of the CDM, despite claims that such 
co-benefits will materialise. As with a lot of the international debates, the CDM 
takes a very narrow framing of the transfer of technology, and as a result has 
no system that encourages or fosters technological capability building and self-
reinforcing low-carbon development processes. Consequently, any low-carbon 
development that does occur is more the result of good fortune than of framing 
or strategy.
This disappointing picture is, to an extent, an overstatement on our part. The 
interest in co-benefits clearly indicates hope for the importance of CDM projects 
beyond carbon emissions trading and revenues. There are projects and 
discussions where a deeper and broader framing of technology transfer linked to 
local development is in play. The technology and finance framing of the energy 
challenges can be enriched here by insights from decades of research and 
debate about technology transfer and industrialisation, and from which some of 
the above evaluative concerns about technological capabilities arise.
However, when we begin to consider processes beyond the narrow (and static) 
framing of technology and finance, it becomes apparent that the transformation 
of contexts for low-carbon innovation is important. In other words, incorporating 
capability-building processes into a technology and finance frame is possible 
in principle, but it changes the understanding of energy systems in low-carbon 
development so much that ‘technology transfer’ no longer does justice to the 
goals. A socio-technical transitions approach provides an alternative framing 
capable of incorporating broader processes, and with a transformation of contexts 
in mind. This is the focus of our discussion in the following sections. However, we 
first need to consider some of the processes beyond the technology and finance 
frame.
26
6. What the technology-finance framing underplays: 
capabilities, contexts and political economies
Alongside, interwoven with and, at times, underpinning the international 
negotiations over technology and finance has been a growing academic 
literature on technical change in developing countries. We can identify, for our 
current purposes, two important streams in this literature: one concerned with 
industrialisation and the cultivation of indigenous innovative capabilities; the 
other often concerned with the adoption of energy technologies in the household 
but linking to industrialisation more generally. We will review these two streams 
here in order to argue that they provide us with many useful insights regarding 
how the building of technological capabilities can be achieved in developing 
countries. Relatedly, we unpack the framing of the idea of ‘technology needs’ 
within international policy. This facilitates insights into why certain conceptions of 
low carbon development, which are less oriented around the needs of indigenous 
firms and households in developing countries, are sustained by the dominant 
hardware financing policy approach.
One of the guiding assumptions of this paper is that developing countries need 
to be accumulating their own low-carbon innovation capabilities if we are to see 
both sustainable development succeed and to avoid dangerous climate change. 
Our reviews will reveal the complexities of the challenge of building technological 
capabilities, in stark contrast to the often simplistic understanding reflected in 
international negotiations (and mechanisms). However, we will also argue that 
this literature has yet to synthesise these insights into a broader framework that 
can incorporate the political economy of technology together with the micro-
details of capability-building in firms and among other actors, and their integration 
into sustainable innovation systems.
6.1 Technical change and industrialisation
From the 1960s to the mid 1970s, technology transfer from industrialised-country 
firms to industrialising-country firms was assumed to be largely an event rather 
than a process. Even understood in this way, the term ‘transfer’ is something 
of a misnomer, considering that it was about buying technology and so would 
be more accurately described as ‘transaction’ (Bell 1997). In any case, as a 
result of this ‘event’ view of ‘technology transfer’, the primary focus of concern 
from the perspective of developing countries was on cost and contractual terms 
(Bell 1997; Radošević 1999). This concern was not unreasonable in itself, 
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particularly as studies of the purchase of technology revealed that the costs to 
developing countries were often high and contractual terms severely restrictive. 
In response to these revelations, many developing countries were pre-occupied 
with establishing or strengthening institutions that could negotiate better prices 
and terms on behalf of domestic firms, the results of which have been judged to 
be mostly successful (Bell 1997; Radošević 1999). 
Notwithstanding these few successes, during this early period, it was increasingly 
clear that the returns to ‘technology transfer’ were highly uneven across the 
developing-country economies (Bell and Pavitt 1993). It had been assumed that 
technologies purchased from the industrialised economies would automatically, 
and un-problematically, enable industrialising-country firms to perform to the 
same level of productive efficiency as firms in the developed economies (Bell and 
Pavitt 1993; Bell 1997). This assumption had some validity during the early period, 
as initial productivity gains were indeed experienced by developing-country firms 
following the acquisition of technology from the developed-country suppliers. But 
the assumption became increasingly questionable over time, with two sets of 
reasons given to explain uneven outcomes. First, the nature of technology was 
changing (see below), and changing at accelerating rates (Bell and Pavitt 1993). 
Second, the gains were primarily the result of efficiency improvements in sectors 
for which any particular developing-country economy happened to enjoy an initial 
comparative advantage (Bastos and Cooper 1995; Bell 1997; Radošević 1999).
With regard to the changing nature of technology, the understanding during the 
period to the mid 1970s had, in effect, been blind to the processes by which 
artefacts had been ‘transferred’, diffused, adopted and adapted. This blindness 
was, at least in part, the result of a narrow conceptualisation of technology (as 
hardware) and a misconception of the use of technology as a ‘plug and play’ 
phenomenon by an essentially passive recipient. The concept of technology 
simply as hardware prevents recognition that knowledge is embedded within its 
design and functionality, as well as deeper cultural assumptions that underlie 
that embedded knowledge (Pacey 1983; Bell and Pavitt 1993; Wynne 1995). 
The increasing intensity of this knowledge-embeddedness is an important 
explanatory factor of the highly uneven record of technical change, as we discuss 
below. Overlaying this was a growing recognition that the domestication of any 
given technology also involved a considerable amount of ‘tacit’ knowledge that 
accumulated through use and experimentation, and could not be codified in user 
manuals (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). The ‘plug and play’ misconception neglects the 
importance of subsequent processes of technological adaptation by those using 
the technology. As Barnett (1990: 543) states, with respect to the developed 
countries:
“… much of the increase in productivity in industrialized countries is 
achieved through the aggregation of myriads of minor changes to existing 
production processes (rather than from individual massive jumps in 
productivity achieved through investment in new vintages of technology).”
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The two misconceptions are, of course, related. If knowledge is embedded in 
technological hardware (and processes), as well as tacit knowledge requirements 
to get the technology  to work effectively, then the ability to change hardware (or 
processes) depends significantly on understanding the processes of knowledge 
accumulation and related capability building. In short, the absorptive capacity7 (of 
a firm, sector, country) is important to be able to adopt and adapt technological 
hardware. Bell and Pavitt (1993) argue that the early period of technology 
diffusion-adoption was characterised by hardware that was sufficiently ‘light’ 
on knowledge-intensity that operating such equipment provided opportunities 
to understand the embedded knowledge and so be able to make successful 
modifications to the hardware or processes. Over time, the knowledge-intensity of 
technology has been increasing, as has the degree of specialisation and the extent 
of differentiation of industrial production equipment, knowledge and services, 
along with an increasing optimum scale of production. The effect has been a 
“widening gap between … technology-using and technology-changing skills 
[which] has reduced the possibilities of acquiring the latter largely by experience 
in the former” (Bell and Pavitt 1993: 164). Box 2 gives a simple illustration of the 
increasing knowledge intensity of technology in the case of boilers for coal-fired 
power generators.
While gains may have been realised through improving and adapting technologies 
purchased elsewhere, they were nevertheless along existing technological 
trajectories. The gains may well have been valuable – we do not wish to argue 
that efficiency improvements are not worth pursuing – but they were associated 
more with growth than development, where ‘development’ in this sense is 
understood to mean movement along new technological trajectories and/or the 
process of enhancing capabilities to create new trajectories. Moreover, there 
are limits to the gains available through efficiency improvements – or at least 
diminishing returns – and there are potential ‘rebound effects’ that could raise the 
aggregate demand for resources and increase the production of pollution (Sorrell 
2007). Many scholars have argued, and continue to do so, that the conflation of 
growth with development means that we miss the distinction between the ability to 
make progress along an existing trajectory (growth) and the ability to create a new 
trajectory (development). Both abilities are important for economic activity, but the 
creative ability is a necessary condition for a country to realise its own low-carbon 
pathways. Without these dynamic technological capabilities, it is difficult to see 
how developing countries could do better than exploit existing static comparative 
advantages, as seems to be the case for the CDM, and from which they run 
the risk of becoming ‘stuck’ on low-technology – low value-added – development 
trajectories (Bastos and Cooper 1995; Radošević 1999; Khan and Blankenburg 
2009).
7 The concept of absorptive capacity captures the degree to which the knowledge and 
skills necessary to adopt a technology, or understand and make use of new technical 
information, are present in the adopting firm, sector, country, etc. The idea is that the higher 
the absorptive capacity, the more readily a technology or new information can be adopted 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
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Box 2: Increasing knowledge intensity of technology
A simple example of the increasing knowledge-embeddedness of technologies 
can be seen in the boilers for coal-fired power plants. Learning to manufacture 
boilers was relatively easy to do on the basis of learning-by-using. Drawings and 
explicit design processes were available, and the skills for manufacture could be 
developed to a large extent through operation, repair and maintenance. Indeed, 
many firms in developing countries such as China are now able to manufacture 
boilers competently. However, the most efficient boilers are now designed using 
computer-modelling. The knowledge and skills necessary for this kind of design 
are no longer easily imitated or accumulated through learning-by-using. Instead, 
such knowledge and skills are embedded in boiler hardware through opaque (to 
the user) design processes hidden in computer software. This design ‘edge’ has 
been closely guarded by some industrialised-country firms, active in China through 
‘technology transfer’, as a way to maintain their market power while exploiting 
lower manufacturing costs (Watson et al. 2000). No amount of operating, repairing 
and maintaining such boilers will afford opportunities to understand the computer 
models used to design them. That would require training and experience in the 
design processes themselves, working particularly with those who are skilled and 
knowledgeable in using those processes.
The discussion so far has been confined to the technical characteristics of 
technologies and technical change. But, as Bell and Pavitt’s (1993) observation 
of the knowledge-intensity of technologies implies, the infrastructural dimensions 
of technical change also need to be considered if we are to see the successful 
development of technological capabilities. Indeed, this is already incorporated 
into the Bell and Pavitt definition of technological capabilities, which includes 
“institutional structures and linkages” (Bell and Pavitt 1993: 163). This need to 
consider infrastructure is underlined if Bell and Pavitt’s observation of increasing 
specialisation and differentiation is an accurate one. That is, if the various 
‘functions’ of technical change – “e.g. … design, production engineering, quality 
control, R&D, and … basic research” (Bell and Pavitt 1993: 201) – are being 
located increasingly in specialised firms and organisations then the form and 
quality of the linkages between them are becoming increasingly critical to the 
functioning of each, and to the functioning of the ‘whole’. Not only this, but the 
increasingly specialised knowledge required for creating technical change 
suggests that developing-country training and education systems need to receive 
sustained investment and strategic development. Box 3 attempts to show how 
concerted effort in India led to the building of an indigenous photovoltaic (PV) 
industry that now exports to industrialised countries. While there could be many 
improvements to the capabilities of Indian PV firms, and to the capabilities of the 
local industry and its ‘innovation system’ in general, it is clear that links between 
the various actors relevant to a particular sector are important, both locally and 
internationally.
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Whether we conceptualise the group of firms and organisations, together with 
their linkages, as supply or value chains, clusters, networks, or systems, we 
cannot assume that functional relationships will emerge spontaneously. Moreover, 
experience demonstrates that even deliberate fostering of these linkages needs 
to be realised carefully and with some understanding of sequencing. Bell (1997) 
argues this with reference to a number of studies, from as early as the 1970s, 
focused on a range of countries in Latin America and East and South East Asia. 
Citing the work of Katz and colleagues (Katz 1987), and research conducted by 
Hobday (1995a, b) and Kim et al. (1989), Bell discusses two different sets of 
approaches to establishing inter-firm and organisation linkages; one based on 
centralised R&D services and the other more sequenced along a ‘simple’ to 
‘complex’ trajectory. The centralised approach, in which R&D organisations were 
expected to conduct research on behalf of private firms, was unsuccessful, largely 
because the R&D organisations and private firms were unable to communicate 
with each other. That is, private firms, without sufficient existing technological 
capabilities, were unable to articulate their technical needs in a form that the 
R&D organisations could use to focus their research, and R&D organisations 
were not necessarily interested in the technologies that the firms were using. So, 
while the ‘pieces’ of an ‘innovation system’ were in place, from the perspective of 
technological capability-building, the system was disarticulated and dysfunctional. 
In the sequencing strategy, there was considerably more success. As Bell (1997: 
75) puts it:
“… dynamic technological capabilities are cumulatively built ‘upwards’ 
from simpler to more complex design, engineering and managerial 
competences, not ‘downwards’ from R & D.”
The building of technological capabilities, then, is an increasingly complex 
process that involves micro-learning experiences within firms, supported by 
articulate interactions with other firms and organisations, each drawing on the 
human resources available from training institutions at all levels, highly cognisant 
of user-needs, and is resource-intensive and long-term. But this complex picture 
is not ‘complete’ without recognition and understanding of the role of policy and 
the implications of such for the dynamics of what we could call political economy. 
The simple argument supporting this assertion lies in the observation that any 
state looking to create and exploit technological trajectories, which do not begin 
from static comparative advantages, cannot rely on market forces to produce the 
desired outcomes (Bastos and Cooper 1995; Bell 1997; Khan and Blankenburg 
2009). Following from this observation, the state must therefore intervene in some 
form to encourage the creation of those trajectories. That will mean a variety 
of actions that could include new policies, legal and regulatory measures, and 
the commitment of resources. Any one of these actions will require political 
choices, with consequent challenges to existing economic and political interests 
as well as raising opportunities for new interests (Barnett 1990). In the context 
of developing countries, we should not forget that donors, and the multilateral 
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development institutions, will also play significant roles in these dynamics. We 
could, therefore, conceptualise interacting and interdependent levels of political 
economy from the village to the international arena. And, if we accept this line 
of argument, crucial issues of framing, legitimacy and governance immediately 
come into view (see section 3 on pathways): How are technological trajectories 
(and associated pathways) to be identified? Who decides which pathways 
to encourage, who benefits, who loses, and so on? Whose voices are most 
influential in the interactions from which pathways emerge? Box 4 provides an 
example of interacting levels of political economy in the context of biofuels in 
Brazil and beyond.
Box 3: The development of an Indian PV (photovoltaic) industry
Drawing on Mallett et al. (2009) and Haum (2010), who analyse the development 
of PV production capacity in India, we can see an example of the importance 
for inter-linkages between firms and other actors, and the deliberate fostering of 
these links and supporting infrastructure. 
In the mid 1970s, the Government of India (GOI) began supporting the development 
of an indigenous PV industry. Under the Solar Photovoltaic Programme (SPP), 
state-owned enterprises were assisted to build R&D, test and production facilities, 
including the indigenous construction of PV manufacturing equipment rather than 
its purchase from abroad. In the 1980s, one of the state-owned enterprises sent 
operations staff for training and experience with a US PV manufacturer. Private 
firms were allowed to enter PV cell and module production at the end of the 1980s, 
and the GOI began to use incentives for PV production such as tax exemptions 
and procurement of systems for various communications applications. From 
the mid 1990s, the GOI began to reduce its procurement for communications 
but instead supported PV through its rural electrification programme. The rural 
electrification programme only partially exploited the production capacity now 
available and so private firms began to export PV hardware. Over time, these 
export markets have become more important to the private sector than the rural 
electrification programme, and the GOI continues to support the PV industry 
through industrial policy.
The international links that PV firms have been able to develop, through various 
means, have enabled them to continue to enhance their technological capabilities. 
Indian firms have used the networks developed through training staff overseas to 
keep up to date with technological developments; and they have used a number 
of ways to get access to technologies where IPRs remain a potential ‘barrier’, 
including the use of licensing, collaboration and acquisition, and in-house R&D. 
While these international links have been important to the development of the 
Indian PV industry, there are some firms who believe that the GOI could do more 
to help them by supporting the local infrastructure. In particular, this support could 
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be in the form of more R&D facilities that could make use of the engineering skills 
available in India and at lower cost than those in industrialised countries.
We can see from the example in Box 4 not only the importance of political-
economic analyses for understanding how power and politics shape the direction 
of technological capability building, but also some of the potential benefits and 
dangers of policy interventions that seek to create or strengthen particular 
technological trajectories or pathways. That is, we can see that incentives of 
various kinds generate, in effect, ‘rents’ that attract rent-seekers who may become 
powerful constituencies that are difficult to manage when attempts are made to 
remove those rents. However, we should not necessarily see this as an argument 
against rent creation per se. Khan and Blankenburg (2009), for example, argue 
that a more useful approach would be to consider the compatibility of such 
policies with their internal and external political-economic contexts, and that any 
state making use of rent-creating incentives needs to develop rent-management 
capabilities.
Box 4: Biofuels and interacting levels of political economy
An illustration of the interacting levels of political economy is provided in two 
papers on biofuels; one concentrated on Brazil (Lehtonen 2009), and the other 
at the international level but with particular attention to Brazil (Dauvergne and 
Neville 2009). Lehtonen (2009) analyses a complex set of political-economic 
relationships and dynamics within Brazil’s bioethanol sector, which started in the 
1960s when sugarcane received increasing state support as part of the drive 
for economic development. Bioethanol was initially a by-product of sugarcane 
production sold into a niche market but became increasingly important during 
the 1970s, as Brazil attempted to reduce its oil consumption but maintain its car 
manufacturing industry, while cane producers looked for new markets in response 
to the steep decline in world prices for sugar. In the process, two centres of ethanol 
production grew in the country: one in the northeast, where there was a long-
standing dependence on sugarcane production and where little modernisation 
of production was realised; and one in the southeast, around São Paulo, 
where a more modern bioethanol sector was developed. The sector benefited 
from a number of state-supported measures, including investment subsidies, 
price controls, import protection, R&D programmes, and others, resulting in 
increasingly powerful economic interests with political influence, and further 
concentration of land-ownership in both the northeast and São Paulo. However, 
from the mid 1980s, with the rise of democratic values and market liberalism, and 
amid falling oil prices and a deepening debt crisis, disillusionment with the military 
government and power struggles within the bioethanol sector resulted in severe 
cuts to subsidies and the closure of many production units (130 in the period 1987 
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to 1997). The balance of power within the sector shifted in favour of the producers 
around São Paulo where some policy-help continued (the share of ethanol in 
petrol was maintained), because of the employment and environmental benefits 
associated with ethanol-powered vehicles.
The sector enjoyed a resurgence around the beginning of this decade as “energy 
security … record-high oil prices, increasing concern for climate change, and 
the introduction of the flex-fuel car” have driven local and international policy 
agendas (Lehtonen 2009: 7). However, this resurgence faces a new challenge 
as the initial international enthusiasm for biofuels in general has turned to fears 
that their expansion will “drive up food and land prices, and increase pressure 
for land conversion and deforestation” (Dauvergne and Neville 2009: 1088). 
These doubts have contributed to political and economic struggles internationally. 
Dauvergne and Neville (2009: 1091) point in particular to the discussions within 
the EU over biofuel policy and how these can be broadly classified into producer 
and consumer camps: those countries who stand to gain from biofuel expansion 
and those who stand to lose. In response to the uncertainties for the sector 
caused by such struggles, Brazil has been seeking partnerships with other biofuel 
leaders (notably the US) and new markets in developing countries where, it is 
suspected, the concerns over land, food and other environmental impacts will be 
overshadowed by increasing energy demands to power economic growth.
This brief review of the industrialisation stream of the literature on technical 
change in developing countries demonstrates that ‘technology’ is more than 
hardware. However, its expanded understanding has not reached further beyond 
processes of knowledge and capability accumulation between firms. But, as 
sections 2 and 3 emphasise, one needs to broaden the analysis further in order to 
understand how firm-derived energy technologies go out and induce or become 
domesticated within broader development processes (also Smith et al. 2010). 
This becomes more apparent when we turn to household energy practices in the 
next sub-section. 
Recognition that technology can be dimensioned in a more sophisticated socio-
technical way than hardware yields important insights into the challenges of 
building innovation capabilities in general, and not just in narrow, firm-based 
innovation systems. This is so even when there are static comparative advantages 
that can be exploited. Technological artefacts are embedded with knowledge and 
cultural assumptions, require skills for their use, and are situated in systems of 
interconnected and interdependent actors, including users of the technologies 
and people reproducing energy service practices, as well as civil associations and 
others in the broader social milieu. 
Furthermore, the direction of technical change is significantly influenced by an 
institutional environment (rules, regulations, laws, policies) that co-evolves with 
political and economic interests at all levels from the local to the international. 
This environment is even more critical in cases where no static comparative 
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advantages exist; where new development pathways are to be created, with 
particular technological trajectories at their heart. These are generally the 
conditions that apply in the case of low-carbon development or innovation. That 
is, where there is only weak or no logic of simple economic efficiency, the building 
of innovation capabilities needs careful nurturing. Low-carbon technologies 
are usually in this category and, moreover, are still perceived to be radical and 
therefore risky. The literature reviewed above tells us that this is a long-term 
endeavour requiring interventions on multiple dimensions while facing powerful 
interests. It seems to us that a technology and finance framing that is expanded 
to try and incorporate all these other processes actually becomes a very different 
framing of energy challenges altogether. It becomes a framing concerned with 
the manifold, and multi-levelled processes of socio-technical transformation, that 
includes the development of distributed capabilities, supportive infrastructures, 
and political economies all favourable to the pursuit of low-carbon development 
pathways.
These insights are from the perspective of industrialisation. The other end of the 
development spectrum, so to speak, is at the household level and focuses on the 
adoption of small-scale technologies that convert energy into useful household 
services. The next section reviews this literature briefly and finds that there are 
similar ‘pathways-relevant’ insights to those emerging from the industrialisation 
literature. From here, we will be able to argue in section 7 that we can begin to 
synthesise these insights into an integrating socio-technical transitions framework. 
Once we have presented these ideas, we will be able to identify the issues that 
emerge from all our discussions to point to an ambitious research agenda.
6.2 Rural household energy services and development
The energy-development relationship in the context of the household has also 
received a great deal of attention in the literature, focused primarily on technology 
fixes that could avoid or reduce the use of oil. That concern grew out of responses 
to the oil crises of the 1970s, which led to an increasing awareness of the energy 
needs of households in developing countries and the understanding that these 
were being met largely through the unsustainable exploitation of biomass 
(Goodman 1984: i; Gill 1987: 135). Consequently, more efficient or renewable 
energy conversion technologies were thought to be necessary to tackle this 
problem. Within the household context, therefore, technical change has been 
discussed in terms of technology adoption and the economics for users of 
particular technological choices. Nevertheless, alongside these concerns for 
economic efficiency, there is a significant discussion of the prospects for local 
manufacture of various technologies and the implications of such for industrial 
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development8 (Barnett 1990). However, for the purposes of this discussion, we 
shall concentrate on the adoption aspects of this literature, leaving aside the 
concerns for industrialisation, notwithstanding the note already made of the 
linkages between household energy needs and demands, and the possibilities 
these afford for local commercial growth and development.
According to Barnett (1990: 542), the early research on adoption of technologies 
was mainly “focused on the social-psychological aspects of the diffusion process 
and … the personality traits of the adopters”, a useful approach but “flawed by 
neglect of the characteristics of the technology being diffused”. However, this 
was not an appeal to shift to a purely technocratic understanding of adoption. 
Discussions in the literature were beginning to acknowledge that technological 
artefacts include embedded knowledge and cultural assumptions (Pacey 1983, 
cited in Green 1999: 1134; Bell and Pavitt 1993); one implication being that 
differences between the ‘content’ of a dimension – the embedded content of the 
artefact versus the embodied content of the user – were sources of tension and 
potential failure in technology-adoption processes. Whatever the merits of this 
multi-dimensional view of technology, empirical studies of technology adoption 
suggest that the technical characteristics of an artefact are not necessarily the 
primary determinant of success or failure, assuming the artefact at least performs 
reasonably well. 
For example, improved stoves have been introduced through many projects 
around the world with the intention to reduce the amount of wood consumed and 
the amount of smoke produced in kitchens or homes9 (Gill 1987). While there 
have been notable successes of the dissemination of improved stoves, such 
as the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (Jones 1986), other interventions have failed. Gill 
(1987: 138) describes how stove programmes in villages in a number of countries 
emphasised fuel economy whereas the villagers, among other needs10, “were 
more concerned about being able to cook quickly than about fuel efficiency”.
8 The latter point highlights how it is somewhat artificial to completely separate the energy-
development relationships of the household sector from those of industrialisation.
9 The perceived benefits being reduced deforestation and wood-collection, as well as less 
smoke produced in the home or kitchen leading to health gains. Gill (1987) questions some 
of the assumptions behind these efforts, suggesting that traditional cooking techniques are 
often more efficient than believed and the main cause of deforestation is land-clearance 
for agriculture rather than wood-collection for fuel. Moreover, many of the ‘improved’ 
stoves did not result in efficiency gains and could produce more smoke than open fires, 
if used incorrectly. This is not to denigrate the aims of these projects; it is to illustrate that 
technological artefacts are embedded with assumptions that may not be robust across 
different contexts.
10 Some of these other concerns include: versatility, where the stove needs to be able to 
accept a wide variety of combustible materials; multi-functionality, where the stove may be 
used for space heating and light (and, indeed, smoke may be useful as it deters insects and 
can cure food); and social and symbolic values that outweigh improved cooking efficiency 
(Gill 1987: 138-139).
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If the energy source for lighting is kerosene or some form of biomass then there 
can be serious impacts on health. Not only do health problems detract from the 
quality of life directly but they also have implications on productivity and income: 
visits to doctors who may be far away will reduce time available for productive 
activity and so reduce personal income (and labour-productivity in the commercial 
sector); and there may be fees for seeing doctors and the costs of medicines.
Furthermore, many researchers and practitioners were already pointing to broader 
issues in technology transfer-adoption processes that have important influences 
on success or failure outcomes, as well as less instrumental concerns such as 
equity and legitimacy11. In terms of the more overtly instrumental, Green (1999: 
1134, following Aasen et al. 1990) describes these broader issues as constituting 
“the larger web of technical infrastructure”, particularly the organisational 
framework of “transfer”, and the organisational and technological infrastructure 
of the “receiver country”. The organisational framework refers to whether a 
technology is introduced through a project or firm (or some combination); the 
technological infrastructure refers to systems that support the functioning of a 
technology such as the general level of technical education, maintenance skills, 
and so on; while the organisational infrastructure refers to systems that support 
planning, coordination and management of technical change processes (Aasen 
et al. 1990: 31-33). The infrastructure cannot be taken for granted and can often 
be missing or weak in rural areas of developing countries, requiring the prolonged 
and purposive training of managers, technicians and others in supply and support 
services if technical change is to be somehow sustainable (Hankins 1995: 119-
120; Green 1999: 1134).
But, so far, we have only considered the literature in terms of the supply-side 
of the technology adoption process. On the side of demand, the literature also 
has important insights to convey. As much as technology includes a broader 
infrastructure of supply – managerial, design, installation, maintenance, and repair 
skills and systems – so the demand side involves supportive skills, knowledge and 
the capabilities to articulate the needs of users. In the rural areas of developing 
countries where there can often be little experience of anything but the simplest 
technologies, such skills, knowledge and capabilities tend to be lacking. In such 
circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect a user to be able to know how to choose, 
operate or maintain a solar home system (for example) without some degree 
of training (indeed, much the same could be said for wealthier countries where 
technologies such as solar home systems are also unfamiliar). Such training can 
be given – by an installer, perhaps – but this is a ‘shallow’ form of the articulation 
11 Our use of the phrase “less instrumental” is deliberate: the issues of equity and legitimacy, 
while clearly rooted in a moral concern, are linked in a substantive sense to the instrumental. 
An argument for this includes the idea that users will not willingly adopt, in the long term, 
artefacts that worsen their equity or for which they cannot identify any legitimacy. They may 
adopt such artefacts in the short term, or under coercion, but the tensions generated will 
lead to failure in the long term.
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of user needs. A deeper form would involve users early in the adoption process 
– and ideally in design – increasing the chances that an artefact would be suited 
to a user’s needs. In this sense, the literature talks of participation (Barnett 1982, 
1990; Agarwal 1986; Heidenreich 1993; Green 1999).
Box 5: Two approaches to the design and diffusion of wood-burning stoves
Two approaches to wood-burning stove dissemination projects, cited in 
Agarwal (1986), illustrate the difference that user-participation can make. The 
first concerns an attempt in the late 1960s in Ghana to replace open fires in 
household kitchens with more efficient (and cleaner) wood stoves. There had 
been no interactions with users prior to design of the stoves, a weakness in the 
project that only became apparent much later when it was found by the mid 1970s 
that many of the stoves originally installed were no longer in use. Agarwal (1986: 
77) quotes a vivid description, given by Hoskins (1979: 37), of the effect that the 
lack of understanding amongst the project implementers of cultural and cooking 
practices had on the stove design:
“If they had tried cooking in 1½ ft tall kettles, constantly stirring mush for ten 
people with a large wooden paddle, they would not suggest waist-high wood 
stoves (unless they also added step-stools), flat bottomed pans (which burn 
around the edges) and lids (for pots requiring constant stirring).”
There were other problems too. The stove used larger pieces of wood than open 
fires for which the women had to search further afield, increasing rather than 
reducing their burdens. And, if the stove was used ‘incorrectly’ – that is, using 
loosely fitting pots or not covering all the holes of the stove – it would burn more 
wood and cause more smoke than an open fire.
By contrast, Agarwal (1986: 83) reports on a more intensively interactive stove 
design-diffusion approach in north-west India undertaken by Madhu Sarin and 
described in Sarin (1981). Quoting Agarwal (1986: 83):
“Each stove, built from local clay, was made user-specific in terms of its location 
within the kitchen, its size, the cooking routine of the family, the number of pot 
holes, the size of the pots and the overall aesthetics of design. The stove was 
usually built jointly by Sarin and the female members of the household, with other 
village women sometimes helping in or observing the process. Modifications were 
made after the user had utilized the stove for some time and found some aspects 
unsatisfactory.”
A number of benefits apparently followed this method of ‘diffusion’. These 
included: high acceptance and satisfaction among users, with subsequent 
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informal dissemination among family, friends and neighbours; the development of 
capabilities to build stoves without the assistance of Sarin; and technical success 
in terms of less wood burned, as well as increased ability of users to modify and 
repair stoves themselves.
In addition, much of this presumes a willingness or even enthusiasm for adopting 
new energy technologies. A socio-technical perspective considers these technical 
changes in the light of prevailing energy practices, in which often invisible routines 
of daily life nevertheless contain significant ideas and norms about certain energy 
services, like thermal comfort, and the normal ways for fulfilling them. As well as 
requiring skills to perform those services with the given technologies, this is as 
much about the socio-technical evolution of social norms. Low-carbon practices 
are about unsettling and re-configuring the tightly coupled links between skills/
capabilities in relation to meanings/ideas in relation to technologies/things (Shove 
2003).
Finally, the energy-development relationship in the rural household context does 
not escape the influences of political economy. Once again, many researchers 
and practitioners point to the importance of this aspect (Barnett 1982, 1990; 
Agarwal 1986; Heidenreich 1993; Green 1999; Smits and Bush 2010). These 
influences can operate at different levels – from local to international – and interact 
across those levels. For example, Agarwal (1986: 91) discusses the impact on 
information flow of extension work biases towards “the economically and socially 
privileged households” who tend to be targeted with innovations while poorer 
households are ignored or treated condescendingly. Barnett (1990: 549) notes 
that “the government of the Philippines took no action to subsidize the diffusion of 
wood stoves, because it was felt that such action would inevitably undermine the 
already thriving stove production industry”.
An illustration of the interplay of domestic and international political economies 
is given in Smits and Bush (2010), where they argue that the Lao government 
have been neglecting the potential for rural electrification of pico-hydropower12 
because of a combination of interests of national and international actors. The 
government’s focus on the development of large hydropower has enabled the 
centralisation of control of water resources, provided opportunities to claim equity 
shares between 20-25% of the projects, plan to supply electricity to neighbouring 
countries, secure large-scale funding opportunities from development banks, and 
maintain a “command and control” policy environment. Where the government is 
concerned with off-grid provision of electricity, it appears that the focus is on Solar 
Home Systems (SHSs). The implication in the Smits and Bush paper is that this 
focus on SHSs results from the dominance of “a small group of actors led by the 
12 Smits and Bush (2010: 116, note 1) use the term “pico-hydropower” to refer to electricity 
generated from the flow of water, and to a maximum of 1 kW for use at the household level.
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[Government of Lao] and the World Bank” (Smits and Bush 2010: 120), the funding 
of the subsidised SHSs coming from the GEF. Meanwhile, there is estimated 
to be about 60,000 pico-hydropower installations in the country (in contrast to 
about 6,000 SHSs) but development and promotion of the technology, the authors 
argue, is being neglected because of the desire of multilateral development 
actors for a single rural electrification model, and the government’s interests of 
centralisation, and “maximising foreign investment and export revenues” (Smits 
and Bush 2010: 126).
6.3 Technology ‘needs’
A final issue that warrants consideration in relation to current framings of 
technology transfer and low-carbon development is the idea of ‘technology 
needs’. Aside from the hardware financing policy mechanisms implemented 
under the UNFCCC, activities under the Convention have also included the 
introduction of a process encouraging developing nations to produce Technology 
Needs Assessments (TNAs). These are supposed to form a basis against which 
policy actions to facilitate technology transfer under the Convention can be 
focused, although there is little clarity as to how this integration of TNAs with 
delivery mechanisms is expected to occur. In reality, as demonstrated above, the 
production of TNAs has very little to do with what technologies are transferred to 
which developing countries – this is more an artefact of the hardware financing 
architecture of international climate change policy which has led to an uneven 
geographical distribution of a limited number of technologies. Nevertheless, 
within a pathways perspective of low-carbon development, the idea of technology 
needs – how they are framed, and by who – forms a useful focus for analysis and 
raises important questions regarding the nature of policy mechanisms and whose 
interests, or ‘needs’, they serve. 
The discussion in the previous two sections constructs two different levels at which 
technology needs might be considered – at the level of industrial development or 
at the level of household technology uptake. At both these levels an implied desire 
to increase the general use of low-carbon technologies is evident. Importantly, at 
both levels (industry and households), the analysis above demonstrates a tension 
between different framings of the nature of technology needs and, relatedly, how 
they might be met. On the one hand, needs might be framed around a need 
to finance the uptake of foreign produced technologies, either industrially or 
among households. At the industry level this framing justifies the kind of hardware 
financing approach that characterises international mechanisms such as the 
CDM. It also justifies a similar external hardware financing approach at the level 
of households: e.g. the dissemination of externally manufactured cook stoves in 
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Ghana that burn less wood (see Box 5 above). The alternative framing of these 
issues discussed above centres around a need to develop indigenous capabilities 
in developing countries, whether at the level of innovation capabilities among 
developing country firms, or the capabilities of households to participate in the 
development and implementation of new technologies (e.g. the capabilities to 
build more efficient cook stoves from locally available materials that fit the social 
practices of their families and facilitate knowledge transfer to others in their 
communities).
In line with the pathways approach, it is clear from the different framings of 
technology needs above, and the different policy approaches they imply, that 
these framings have important implications for the concentration of power and 
benefits stemming from alternative policy options. For example, efforts aimed 
at increasing capabilities amongst developing country firms or households 
imply more networked, participatory, user engaged policy approaches. These in 
turn imply (although cannot guarantee) that power is likely to be more diffuse 
with perhaps more power for developing country firms or technology users 
and communities to play a role in constructing their own visions of appropriate 
technologies and related development pathways. From a political economy 
perspective, this also implies an important shift in the balance of power away from 
advanced technology owning firms who were previously based predominantly in 
industrialised countries (and in the main continue to be, aside from exceptions 
amongst the BRICS countries). 
The idea of a North/South power balance and the way in which different framings of 
technology needs serve different parties’ interests also speaks to a broader tension 
within international negotiations on technology transfer that relates to different 
conceptions of what low-carbon development is, and the role of technology within 
it. If, for example, the key concern of low-carbon development is to meet the 
needs of the global community to reduce greenhouse gases as fast as possible, 
then technology needs might be framed as a need to achieve the widest possible 
diffusion of low-carbon technologies across developing countries, regardless of in 
which developing country or where and by whom within these different countries 
technologies are adopted, or whether or not firms and households in developing 
countries, as opposed to international technology leading firms, have any 
ownership over these technologies. If, on the other hand, low-carbon development 
is seen more as a way to increase the aggregate economic wealth of developing 
countries (often seen as synonymous with development) then technology needs 
might be framed as a requirement for developing country firms to own, operate and 
produce low-carbon technologies as part of an economic development pathway 
underpinned by the increased international competitiveness of indigenous 
companies. Indeed, these broad diffusion vs. development framings are good 
characterisations of the discourses that continue to play out within international 
policy negotiations on climate change and technology transfer (Ockwell et al. 
2010). However, both framings are ignorant of a multitude of context specific 
issues, raising further critical questions relating to framings of technology needs. 
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For example, the geographical insensitivity of the ‘rapid diffusion’ framing ignores 
the possibility discussed further above of LDCs becoming locked-in to high 
carbon pathways. And both framings (rapid diffusion and increasing aggregate 
national wealth) ignore the issue of whose needs low-carbon technologies might 
meet. In poor rural areas, for example, low maintenance configurations of solar 
energy and LED (light emitting diode) technologies might better serve the needs 
of households than low-carbon grid-based electricity generation which might 
better suit the interests of urban industries situated closer to sites where power 
is generated. Both framings (rapid diffusion and increasing aggregate national 
wealth) also risk a fixation on hardware, and ignore the role that knowledge flows 
can play, both in underpinning sustained low-carbon industrial development by 
building indigenous innovation capabilities, or by improving the resilience of poor 
and marginalised people’s livelihoods, such as by the transfer of knowledge of 
less energy intensive farming practices. As these examples imply, this hardware 
fixation also ignores the socio-technical nature of technology use and innovation.
A final aspect of the framing of technology needs that warrants attention here 
is the extent to which international policy approaches recognise the role that 
technology transfer oriented initiatives might play in meeting broader development 
goals than simply ‘low-carbon’ development. Within the UNFCCC’s guidelines 
for the production of TNAs, a definition is employed that alludes to low-carbon 
technology needs as relating to more than simple greenhouse gas mitigation or 
climate change adaptation. Technology needs are also seen as relating to the 
role low-carbon technologies can play in “contributing to sustainable development 
goals” (Gross et al. 2004). Indeed, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol are both more 
broadly framed around a commitment to sustainable development alongside the 
achievement of climate change mitigation and adaptation. A key way that broader 
development goals might be considered in relation to technology needs is via 
engagement with stakeholders when producing national TNAs, thus providing an 
opportunity for the reflexive appraisal of alternative technology options. By reflexive 
appraisal we mean providing space for consideration of different opinions on 
technology needs and exposing the values, interests and subjective assumptions 
that underpin the construction of these different opinions to critical reflection. The 
UNFCCC’s guidance for the production of TNAs seems to recognise the need to 
engage with stakeholders. However, it fails to integrate this with any meaningful 
attempt to elicit a reflexive appraisal of technology options. The TNA manual 
lists the following stakeholder groups as being worthwhile engaging with when 
producing a TNA (Gross et al. 2004: 15): 
• Government Departments with responsibility for policy formulation and 
regulation in energy management (e.g. power supply, industrial processes, 
waste management) and vulnerable sectors (e.g. agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
human health, parks/wildlife)
• Private and public sector industries, associations, and distributors that are 
involved in the provision of utility services (i.e. responsible for GHG emissions) 
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or are sensitive to climate change impacts (e.g. tourism, agriculture, water 
resources, forestry, fisheries)
• Organisations involved in the manufacture, import, and sale of environmentally 
sound technologies or other hard or soft technologies (e.g. software) appropriate 
for mitigation or adaptation
• Households, small businesses, and farmers using the technologies and practices 
in question, and/or who are or could experience some of the effects of climate 
change
• NGOs involved with the promotion of environmental and social objectivs
• Institutions that provide technical and scientific support to both government and 
industry, e.g. academic organisations, industry R&D, think tanks, consultants, 
etc.
• Labour unions, consumer groups, and media
• Country divisions of international companies responsible for investments of 
critical importance to climate policy, e.g. the energy sector, agriculture, forestry
• International organisations and donors
In practice, however, the personal experience of one of the authors (of this STEPS 
paper) as an expert reviewer of the production of one developing country’s TNA 
is that the stakeholders consulted were far more limited in scope – they did not 
include any representation outside of government departments, did not consult 
with the private sector and certainly did not stretch to engaging with households 
and communities. This experience is echoed in the informally expressed views 
of several other observers of the process and outcomes of TNAs under the 
UNFCCC. The only real reference to any more socially oriented concerns within 
the UNFCCC’s TNA production manual is under a section relating to the role of 
stakeholders in conducting a “barriers analysis” where one potential barrier is 
labelled “social and cultural acceptability” with a subsequent elaboration stating 
that “[a] range of cultural practices and beliefs could lead to opposition to certain 
[technology] options” (Gross et al. 2004: 16-17). 
As a result, the TNAs produced to date13 resemble more of a wish list of low-
carbon hardware that countries might like to access, as opposed to any reflexive 
consideration of a country’s needs, including whose needs within that country 
this might relate to, not least with consideration of the needs of poor and socially 
marginalised people within these countries. This is an important observation as 
it again emphasises the fact that technology needs at the level of international 
13 See http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/CountryReports.jsp.
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negotiations are framed very much around both a hardware oriented understanding 
of low-carbon technology needs, and also around an understanding that gives 
little weight either to broader sustainable development goals or to the needs of 
different stakeholders, not least the needs of firms and households, particularly 
poor and socially marginalised households, in developing countries.
So we begin to see the importance of how and by whom different framings 
of technology needs are constructed, and which framings dominate policy 
discussions. On a more pragmatic level, if the arguments we make in the previous 
two sections in favour of an emphasis on capacity building hold true, then these 
different framings also have important implications for the likely success of 
implied policy approaches in underpinning successful long term socio-technical 
transitions to low-carbon energy practices. Indeed, the capacity building oriented 
policy approaches advocated above in and of themselves are framed around a 
broader socio-technical understanding which speaks more directly to the needs of 
end users and producers of technologies in developing countries, whether at the 
level of firms or households. We now reflect on the implications of the technological 
change literatures reviewed above before moving on to demonstrate how a 
socio-technical transitions framing might offer a more productive way forward for 
research and policy approaches to low-carbon development.
6.4 Reflections on the technology transfer literature
This brief review of the literature on what is commonly called ‘technology transfer’ 
has attempted to identify some of the useful insights that we might apply to 
reframing energy challenges in low-carbon development; especially when the 
latter is perceived as an issue of drawing in innovation capabilities from other 
places. The most general insight that the literature provides is that the building 
of technological capabilities is a systemic phenomenon, emerging from long-
term resource-intensive processes that interact interdependently with political 
priorities and economic interests. An enormous amount of empirical research and 
evidence analyses the dynamics of technological capability-building in developing 
countries at firm and sectoral levels; research that tries to understand, enhance 
and hasten the process of industrialisation. There is also a large body of work 
concerned with the adoption of technologies at the level of the household and, 
helpfully for our purposes, does so with respect to energy technologies, although 
this research tends not to characterise the adoption process as technological 
capability-building but rather as user participation. Still, both strands of literature 
share similar insights.
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In particular, it is clear from the discussions above that the view of technology as 
hardware is not only simplistic but also unhelpful when we are trying to understand 
how technological capabilities can be built and accumulated; whether for 
industrialisation, for improving energy services in the household, or whatever the 
development objectives might be. Taking a more multi-dimensional socio-technical 
view allows us to see that technological artefacts (hardware and processes) are 
embedded with knowledge and cultural assumptions, with important implications 
for how those artefacts can be used and changed. Moreover, the very use of 
an artefact is itself an element of the technology: that is, the ‘technology’ is a 
combination of the hardware, the practice of its use, the knowledge relevant to 
this practice – embedded in the artefact and embodied in the user – and the 
institutions that enable its use (norms, regulations, laws, etc.). Understood in this 
way, we can see why the processes of technical change and the building and 
accumulating of technological capabilities are complex, long-term and resource-
intensive. Furthermore, these interactions operate across multiple scales from the 
village to international arenas. 
The discussion above also highlighted how the dominant framings of technology 
and its role in development sustain certain constructions of technology needs 
which do not necessarily attend to the needs of firms and households in developing 
countries. This has important political economy implications and is central to 
determining which vision of low-carbon development technology oriented policy 
fulfils, and whose needs and interests this serves.
Many of these insights are available in the literature on technical change in 
developing countries. However, we would argue that they have yet to be brought 
together into an integrative and coherent framing of the energy challenge in 
low-carbon development. We have, instead, the elements of ‘socio-technical’ 
configurations: the multi-dimensionality of energy practices, supportive 
infrastructures, and political economies of technology. All are recognised as 
important and interdependent parts of a ‘system’. But the ‘system’ is not well 
defined and the interdependence of the elements is either partially understood or 
weakly theorised, creating difficulties for each of the perspectives to communicate 
– let alone integrate – with each other.
We suggest that theoretical and empirical work coming from the ‘socio-technical 
transitions’ literature could be helpful in this regard. This literature takes a multi-
dimensional view of (technological) innovations oriented towards the transformation 
of systems, and provides a framework that enables analysis of the dynamics of 
agency and capability-building over time whilst attending to the structural features 
of the systems one wishes to change. Furthermore, the framework lends itself 
to the study of purposive technological change: how incumbent systems remain 
dominant or resistant to change from promising alternatives; and how promising 
alternatives can influence the dynamics of change in systems. 
The next section outlines these ideas, in whose development members of the 
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STEPS Centre and the Sussex Energy Group in SPRU (also at the University of 
Sussex) have had a hand, but whose major innovations were pioneered by Dutch 
researchers working at the interface of evolutionary economics and science and 
technology studies. This includes René Kemp, Arie Rip, Johan Schot, Frank 
Geels, John Grin, Rob Raven, Jan Rotmans, Derk Loorbach, and others (see 
Smith et al. 2010 for a review). A growing network of international researchers 
are bringing their own perspectives and interpretations to bear, such as Jochen 
Markard and Bernhard Truffer (2008; bringing in innovation systems), Elizabeth 
Shove and Gordon Walker (2007; bringing in constructivist and practice-theory 
sensibilities), Audley Genus and Anne-Marie Coles (2008; bringing in actor 
network theory), Adrian Smith, Andy Stirling and Frans Berkhout (2005; bringing 
in constructivist and political science issues). Here we connect these ‘transitions’ 
ideas with insights from the pathways approach discussed earlier.
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7. Broadening the goals and the analysis: 
a socio-technical transitions framing
• Given the argument above, we believe a reframing of energy challenges is 
required that is able to:
• Focus on the build up of indigenous energy innovation capabilities for low-
carbon development
• Recognise that low-carbon development requires the transformation of incumbent 
systems (cf. the insertion of low-carbon technologies in those systems)
• Attend to the normative values inherent in energy practices
• Be open towards the political economy of energy, including the exercise of power 
through dominant framings of issues such as technology needs
• Recognise that novel, sustainable energy solutions arise amidst existing energy 
practices that are deeply institutionalised
• Cover the multiple socio-technical dimensions of an energy practice
• Bring multiple framings into a dialogue about the development of energy 
pathways
• Consider a plurality of pathways, and understand each in interaction or co-
existence with the other
• Facilitate debate about the kinds of low-carbon pathways to pursue, and the 
prospects and requirements for each.
Conceiving energy and development as a challenge for re-configuring energy 
socio-technical systems (Rip and Kemp 1998) emphasises the considerable 
technical, economic, sociological and political work that has to be done to align 
narratives, actors, artefacts and institutions into the working ensemble that 
constitutes an energy service. This much should be clear from the discussions 
above. 
By way of further example, consider all the material, discursive and institutional 
elements and changes needed to make small-scale bio-gasification power 
stations succeed: specialised knowledge, reliable technologies, skilled workers, 
investment capital, local grid infrastructures, maintenance services, willing 
customers, profitable markets, acceptable environmental impacts, and so 
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on, and so on (Verbong et al. 2010). Considerable social agency is required. 
Technological hardware, supported by public-private R&D, and the financing of 
its transfer and diffusion, supported by international carbon markets, are unlikely 
to generate all these path-building alignments. Each is an important factor in 
the overall governance of low-carbon development, but that governance is not 
reducible to a core factor.
A socio-technical systems perspective allows us to appreciate these recursive 
relationships. For instance, institutions are required to train engineers and provide 
facilities for developing particular styles of technology. These must in turn be 
linked to market incentives, marketing possibilities and the needs of prospective 
consumers. Beyond this, broader social, demographic and ideological processes 
are at work. These include the cultural milieu in which the technology operates, 
where social movements, lifestyle expectations, environmental stresses, 
behavioural patterns and resource endowments all exercise their influence upon 
patterns of technology development and use.
At the same time, researchers note that developing highly novel, path-breaking 
socio-technical practices takes place in a context of deeply embedded, 
substantially institutionalised and widely reproduced ‘socio-technical regimes’ 
(Unruh 2000; Geels 2002). The accumulation over time of capabilities and skills, 
business models and markets, capital and other interests, infrastructures and 
technologies, institutions and user routines, political commitments and social 
values, constitute powerful path dependencies driving incremental innovations 
within the socio-technical regimes that these processes constitute (Geels 2002). 
Box 6 elaborates these path-dependent processes.
At times, it can appear as though societies are ‘locked-in’ to certain energy 
regimes, such as the centralised generation and distribution of energy from fossil-
fuels underpinning high energy consumption lifestyles in wealthy and emerging 
economies; or, for completely different reasons, wood fuel economies in poor 
countries. The transitions literature has developed through an interest in the way 
society has been transformed by changes to some underpinning socio-technical 
systems, such as the move from societies with gas/candle light to societies with 
electric light. Prospective interest in moving to sustainable low-carbon societies 
has a broadly analogous problem framing (Rip and Kemp 1998).
Note here how the regime concept has predominantly been informed by 
industrialised and wealthy country contexts. Its relevance for other development 
contexts still needs to be explored. The central point, regarding the structural 
impediments and opportunities that historical socio-technical alignments present 
for transforming local energy practices nevertheless remains. Even if the regime 
concept requires revising or replacing for certain development situations, a need 
to account for the influence that incumbent energy practices have over alternative 
sustainable energy initiatives will endure.
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In some cases the path-dependency processes may derive more from a lack of 
something towards which there is a strong commitment, but they are nevertheless 
in play. The processes that lock people into wood-fuel regimes include dimensions 
of capabilities and skills regarding its gathering and use, institutions regulating 
wood access, the economics of wood-fuel, cultural associations with any or all of 
these practices, cooking and heating practices developed through reliance upon 
wood fuel, and the embedding of these practices in daily routines that all have to 
be considered when trying to insert alternative energy practices for cooking and 
warmth.
Box 6: Mutually reinforcing path dependencies across different socio-
technical dimensions
Actors vital to the reproduction of energy systems generally tend to favour 
incremental innovation and systems improvement over radical innovation and 
systems transformation. This arises from a host of mechanisms that promote 
stability and resistance to change in socio-technical regimes and which informs 
incremental governance strategies that perpetuate the regime pathway (Walker 
2000; Unruh 2000). These mechanisms include:
Capabilities: The innovation activities of incumbents are constrained by existing 
capabilities and knowledge (Dosi 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982), which channel 
technical developments into restricted subsets of the possible directions (Kemp 
et al. 1998; Elzen et al. 2005). Innovative activities and investments are also 
constrained by existing beliefs and perceptions, routines and habits.
Economics: Existing technologies tend to be cheaper in the short run because 
they have benefited from long periods of dynamic increasing returns (e.g. 
learning-by-doing and using, scale economies and positive network externalities). 
This puts them in advantageous positions compared with novel practices (Arthur 
1989; Dosi 1982).
Vested interests: Incumbents have sunk investments (in capital, competencies 
and social networks, for example) that they will try to protect. They therefore 
resist radical change that threatens them. Large, established industries may 
contain divisions and individuals with more radical ideas, but they are less often 
empowered to implement these if core business interests are thereby challenged.
Politics and power: Incumbent businesses, regulators and others enjoy important 
positions in the current system. Economic power bestows considerable influence; 
they have voices that will be listened to by innovation policy processes (Smith 
et al. 2005). Innovators outside this nexus rely on future expectations to make 
their case. ‘Outsiders’ need not be small players. For example, large information 
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technology companies are outsider innovators in energy systems but have 
a potentially transformative role to play in a move to ‘smart grid’ technologies. 
However, ‘outsider’ innovators are often relatively weakly organised compared 
to incumbents. Whilst today’s shareholders, workers and customers can 
invest, vote and exert influence in numerous ways, tomorrow’s stakeholders in 
more sustainable systems are a constituency less essential to the immediate 
reproduction of current energy systems. 
Infrastructure: Existing technological devices may be embedded in dedicated 
infrastructures that make their substitution with alternatives difficult (Jacobsson 
and Johnson 2000).
Institutions: Government regulations and subsidies, professional associations, 
and market rules have co-evolved as part of existing systems and tend to reinforce 
existing trajectories of development (Hughes 1983; Walker 2000).
Market and consumer cultures: Prevailing market and social attitudes influence 
the kinds of technical performance deemed acceptable; whilst the business 
models, lifestyle norms and routines that are created around them can resist 
novel practices (Shove 2003; Yearley 1988).
In sum, there is a range of mechanisms through which societies collectively 
commit to certain socio-technical pathways rather than others (Geels 2002). 
Systems that have become ‘locked-in’ to these trajectories are difficult to unsettle 
and re-direct. 
In other instances, the socio-technical regimes are more ‘virtual’ but nevertheless 
structuring due to the powerful hold they have in framings for energy system 
aspirations. We can see this in the hold that rural-electrification-as-grid-extension 
has had in many international programmes and national energy policies for rural 
electrification. Familiarity with centralised electricity grids and their apparently 
self-evident desirability amongst consultants, engineers, politicians, energy 
businesses, and others, has worked to frame energy development thinking, 
especially in national energy plans, even when resources and capabilities to 
realise this vision have been lacking. This has meant that support for alternative, 
decentralised approaches to providing electricity has had to make its case in the 
shadow of the grid-extension framing even in contexts where there are no grids 
as yet.
However, inflexible path-dependent alignments can, under shifting circumstances, 
become a source of fragility. Moreover, internal misalignments, brought about by 
technical changes or shifts in ownership or reframings of the energy-development 
challenge, can combine with external processes, such as rising environmental 
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awareness, demographic change, and resource shifts. Such processes can 
unsettle regimes and open windows of opportunity for alternatives to develop, and 
perhaps seed transitions towards radically different configurations and pathways.
Clearly, we are talking about a very complex and heterogeneous collection of 
system processes here. There are various ways of simplifying and thinking about 
that complexity. The multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical transitions 
is one way (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels 2002). We believe it provides analytical 
purchase by providing a framework for situating and relating dynamically the 
structurally-inclined processes of path dependency with the agency-oriented 
processes of path-building. The framework is presented schematically in Figure 9.
The innovative configuration of novel socio-technical energy practices (e.g. 
passive cooling in urban housing) is considered to take place in ‘niches’. These 
spaces of socio-technical agency afford some protections for the alternative 
practice, which cannot compete directly with the incumbent, more structured and 
structuring socio-technical regime (e.g. globally-standardised apartment block 
designs that rely upon mechanical air conditioning). An example could be to 
consider distributed micro-renewables in new urban developments as currently 
constituting a niche, in the context of expanding a centralised, fossil-fuelled 
regime into that development, and in which prevailing energy infrastructures and 
institutions are disadvantageous towards micro-renewables.
In their different ways, both the niche(s) and regime(s) define and relate to a 
specific ‘societal function’, such as certain energy services, classified and 
problematised as ‘technology needs’ in an earlier section. The (reflective) 
realisation14 of these societal functions is the starting point for the analysis and 
the reconstruction of the niche and regime socio-technical configurations. At the 
same time, niches and regimes are situated in similar ‘landscape’ contexts, though 
they experience them and identify with them differently. For instance, processes 
articulating social pressure for carbon emissions reduction or energy access (e.g. 
social movements, policy measures, green business strategies) means different 
things for actors and processes configuring, say, the micro-renewables niche 
(e.g. low-carbon is a potential opportunity) compared to the fossil-fuel electricity 
grid regime (e.g. low-carbon is a threat).
14 We use ‘realise’ to denote the dual, iterative processes of a) figuring out needs and b) 
satisfying those needs.
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Figure 9: The mutli-level perspective on socio-technical transitions.
Transitions are consequently theorised as arising through interactions between 
these three analytical levels: it is the way niches, regimes and landscape 
processes interact that determines the specific transition (Smith et al. 2005; Geels 
and Schot 2007). The MLP has been used to orientate the analysis of various 
kinds of energy transitions:
 1. Historical analyses explaining successful energy transitions at varying scales 
(e.g. the move from sail shipping to steam shipping, the move from coal/town 
gas to natural gas)
 2. Analyses of sustainable energy niches and explanations of the difficulties they 
face in becoming more widespread (e.g. ultra low energy housing compared to 
volume housing)
 3. Both 1. and 2. inform prescriptive and prospective uses of the framework, 
and develop policy recommendations for strategic niche management and 
transition policies that might improve the chances of sustainable, low carbon 
energy transitions.
Analytically, socio-technical systems of varying scales have been studied (e.g. 
international steam shipping, bio-gasification systems, eco-housing practices). 
Source: Geels (2002)
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Prospectively, policy jurisdictions of varying scales have undertaken transition 
policies (e.g. cities, regions, nations) (Loorbach 2007; (Smith and Kern 2009). 
The ‘niche’ and ‘regime’ is a matter of empirical definition; in terms of the scale 
of practice in which one is interested, be it transitions in energy practice in the 
household, dominant wind turbine designs in the industry, entire electricity 
systems, or other units of analysis. The point is that one has to remain aware 
and open to activities going on beyond the unit of analysis, and interpret them in 
terms of what it means for one’s core research concerns. Contexts and pathways 
for change will vary from case to case for complex socio-technical systems 
(Smith et al. 2005; Geels and Schot 2007). In the context of sustainability, it is 
the possibility of accelerating transitions away from unsustainable regimes and 
along more sustainable pathways deriving from niches that preoccupies analysts 
and policy-makers. Here a particular mode of ‘purposive transition’ or ‘transition 
management’ is debated (Kemp et al. 1998; Rotmans et al. 2001; Smith et al. 
2005; Loorbach 2007). Socially negotiated visions for future low-carbon energy 
systems form a point of departure for policy processes that back-cast to the 
deliberate creation of experimental niches (Rotmans et al. 2001). 
Niches are constituted across networks of experimental sites for reflexive 
learning, expectation development, network building and, in cases where niches 
are promising, the institutionalisation of these practices through the development 
of further experiments. On rare occasions a niche develops and grows, and it 
displaces more and more of the incumbent regime provision. Hybrid versions 
emerge as niche ideas are appropriated into an adapting regime (Smith 2007). 
Further destabilisations and growth opportunities arise, but eventually, on those 
rare occasions, a new energy regime may be discernable. 
It has been suggested that rapid development in South and South-East Asia 
provides one such situation (Berkhout et al. 2010). The challenge of low-
carbon sustainability is such that catching-up with the ‘technological frontier’ in 
developed countries will be insufficient. Frans Berkhout and colleagues argue 
that the dynamism in Asia and other late-industrialising regions provides space 
for socio-technical experimentation, and which could seed the creation of entirely 
new regimes that leap-frog the historical industrialisation model. That is the 
hope. There are other pathway dynamics in this region and others that suggest 
unsustainable regimes in the future, and that repeat problematic lock-ins in the 
developed countries, such as car-based urban-transport systems. The challenge 
is to analyse the experimentation with sustainable alternatives in Asia, and other 
regions, in the context of these broader, contending processes of development. 
This may then uncover strategies for promoting more sustainable pathways on 
the basis of niche experimentation (see special issues in Environmental Science 
& Policy (13, 4) and Technological Forecasting & Social Change (76, 2)).
It should be noted, by way of concluding this section, that the MLP framework is 
neutral as to which niches should be promoted and whose momentum should be 
encouraged towards becoming influential pathways for energy and development. 
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Rather, the MLP provides a framework for analysing a plurality of niches and 
explaining their relative success in building momentum in the context of historical 
regime trajectories of development. These niches can be in interaction (and 
competition) with one another as much as with the regime they seek to transform 
or displace. Symmetry in the analysis of niches, regimes and pathways is 
warranted. In each case, however, it is important that the problem framing be kept 
broad – the ambitious transformation of energy systems into low-carbon forms – 
and that the analytical framework is also wide enough to consider the complex 
factors relevant to such a framing. The MLP is alluring because it meets these 
criteria, and provides an account for how pathways may variously build, fizzle out, 
or decline over time; but it is also challenged, precisely because it tries to bring 
the details of innovative agency into play with long-term societal change (Smith 
et al. 2010).
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8. A pathways research agenda for energy 
sustainability in development
Of course, socio-technical experimentation in development is not new. What is 
promising, however, is the way the MLP situates this within a mid-range analytical 
framework that seeks to identify, contextualise and thereby understand wider 
developmental promise. It is noteworthy how development practice and the 
development literature are rich in exemplary local sustainability initiatives for 
energy. These path-breaking projects suggest alternative ways of powering more 
sustainable livelihoods. The local consequences of these initiatives are evaluated, 
praised or criticised; as are the processes by which the specific initiatives came 
about. Such contextually rich studies provide some helpful tips for others wishing 
to emulate the initiative elsewhere. However, broader institutional (political and 
economic) processes that influence the diffusion of path-breaking sustainability 
initiatives are beyond the full grasp of these micro-level studies. At the same 
time, macro-level analysis tends to abstract narrow technical and economic 
performance characteristics from the initiatives, for use elsewhere, much as we 
see in international technology transfer negotiations. As such, they imply a straight-
forward and universal calculus for deciding whether to adopt that presupposes an 
economic rationale or hurdle blind to diverse contexts. Macro-level studies tend 
also to presume a single, rational decision-maker when the reality is of initiatives 
emerging and diffusing through networks of social and technological activity by 
differently situated and perceiving actors. Socio-technical transitions theory may 
well provide a link between innovative agency in local initiatives and incumbent 
structures of technological practice in their broader socio-economic contexts, and 
analyse their respective, interacting transformations over time. 
8.1 Niche based research
Local projects can be conceived as contributing to networks of alternative 
practice (i.e. niches), and which can then draw upon hypotheses for how path-
breaking ‘niches’ contribute to transitions to new structures. In this case, we are 
interested in how niche sustainability socio-technical practices in energy, such 
as solar PV, or low energy housing, attain momentum through diffusion from one 
development initiative to another, and how this constitutes alternative pathways to 
incumbent regimes of energy production. Whilst transitions theory has developed 
over the last decade in a North-west-European context, projects elsewhere 
are already interrogating its relevance in South- and East-Asian contexts. 
Berkhout and colleagues consider the experience of ‘sustainability experiments’ 
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in these regions and their contribution to niches and alternative development 
pathways. Sustainability experiments are understood as “planned initiatives that 
embody a highly novel socio-technical configuration likely to lead to substantial 
(environmental) sustainability gains” (Berkhout et al. 2010: 262). These initiatives 
are where the earliest stages of a process of socio-technical learning take place. 
For example, in a Kenyan context, Byrne (2011) describes how the solar home 
system (SHS) niche began in the mid 1980s following the installation of a small 
PV system in a school. Soon after, some of the school’s staff wanted PV systems 
for their homes. Guided by the expectation this initial socio-technical learning 
created, the PV installers began to develop SHSs and to market them in the local 
area, creating further socio-technical learning about user-preferences, supply 
chains, PV system technicalities, and so on.
Transition theory might help analyse the processes by which similar sustainability 
initiatives do or do not replicate in different localities; opportunities for scaling-
up so that follow-on initiatives benefit more people and communities; and the 
possibilities that path-breaking sustainable innovations may provide adaptable 
and appropriable solutions that can be translated into mainstream development 
settings, thereby building momentum for the novel pathways. Byrne (2011), 
again, illustrates how initial attempts to replicate the success of the Kenyan SHS 
niche failed in Tanzania; the failure attributable to an expectation that was not 
sufficiently cognisant of the Tanzanian context. Nevertheless, expectations that 
SHSs could provide solutions to rural electrification needs in Tanzania persisted 
and, driven in part by donor agendas for low-carbon development and in part 
by a local constituency of support for PV that included private sector actors, a 
number of initiatives were realised in parallel during the 2000s. Within a short 
time frame, donors, private sector actors, local NGOs and energy ministry actors 
were implementing a range of projects and communicating extensively with each 
other as their activities unfolded on the ground across a large area of Tanzania. 
As a result, a great deal of context-specific socio-technical learning was both 
generated and shared (in similar ways to the Kenyan case) and the market for 
SHSs began to grow rapidly.
Networks of similar initiatives, such as those just mentioned in the Tanzanian 
case, can be conceived as niches that provide a protective space in which local-
scale sustainable solutions can be nurtured, and from which they can be diffused 
into new localities and contexts. Existing transition studies suggest that niches 
grow and contribute to pathway momentum through three inter-linked processes: 
a) expectations contribute to successful niche building when they are robust 
(shared by many actors), specific, and of high quality (substantiated by on-
going initiatives); 
b) social networks contribute when their membership is broad (plural perspectives) 
and deep (substantial resource commitments by members); and 
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c) learning processes not only accumulate facts, data and first-order lessons, 
but also generate second-order learning about alternative ways of valuing and 
supporting the niche. 
Niche practices become influential to the extent that processes ‘a’ to ‘c’ above 
become robust enough not only to facilitate diffusion, but also exert influence over 
wider institutional changes, such as policy support. 
Future research needs to test the hypothesis that niches grow through 
replication of initiatives in different locations; that strategic learning across 
replicated initiatives facilitates scaled-up adaptations; and that elements of these 
translate into new business models and markets. Self-replicating diffusion is 
challenging for local sustainability initiatives; support is needed for both niche 
development and initiative-to-initiative networking. This suggests niches do not 
provide blueprints, but rather reservoirs of ideas and practices; and that dedicated 
work is needed to transfer and adapt from across locations, scales and contexts 
(e.g. into commercial prospects), such as observed in the Kenyan and Tanzanian 
solar home system niches referred to above. Of course, given historic difficulties 
in scaling-up and diffusing exemplars, it is likely that future, niche-oriented 
research will also end up studying the difficulties experienced by our hypothetical 
path-building processes: when is social learning ignored; when do expectations 
deflate; and why do networks fragment?
A weakness in the transitions approach is the under-theorised relations between 
located socio-technical initiatives and the emergence of an influential, abstracted, 
niche-level identity and interest, based around stylised socio-technical practices. 
How do strategic niches influence institutional reform? This includes evidence 
that experience with, say, skills or infrastructure issues, gathered from earlier 
initiatives is mobilised into demands for reforms to policy and industrial strategy. 
Whilst the literature argues successful niches prompt facilitating institutional 
reforms within the wider energy regimes, it is unclear why this would happen 
given path-dependencies in those regimes. So what political roles do path-
breaking sustainability niches need to play in order to influence these reform 
processes? This is where social movement theory might inform transitions theory 
and reveal the political roles niches must adopt in sustainability transitions. 
How do niches develop collective identities and interests; what repertoires 
of niche activism press for reforms? Where are the ‘opportunity structures’ 
for pursuing demands? The social technologies movement in Latin America, 
and the appropriate technology movement of an earlier generation, are and 
were mobilising a set of political and institutional demands around alternative 
technological styles (Willoughby 1990). It is striking how many of the ‘soft energy’ 
options characteristic of appropriate technology are now part of the hardware and 
finance discourse, but with the awareness of important local contexts stripped 
away. Social technology advocates are aware of the broader social changes 
required for socially just and environmentally sustainable transformations, whilst 
seeing practical experimentation as furnishing a material base for such wider 
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changes (see Saber Cómo 92, September 2010 15).
On this latter point, we have to look at sustainability niches the other way around, 
from the external perspective of actors committed to the incumbent energy regimes. 
Sustainability transitions theory argues that niche performance is interpreted by 
actors situated in a wider context. Tensions emerging in mainstream energy 
regimes, such as security and environmental crises, cast niche solutions in more 
positive light, and thereby attract interest from policy-makers and businesses 
worried about the regime. What innovations do sustainability niches offer 
concerned businesses and policy-makers in the regime? How do these solutions 
perform in terms of interest for, say, accelerating development, or delivering carbon 
reductions, and at what cost? This speaks to the translation mode of diffusion: 
what niche innovations can be adapted into reforming conventional development 
institutions relevant under different contexts in future? The structural influence of 
the political economy of energy regimes on niches is important here. This also 
speaks to issues raised above in relation to technology needs; how are these 
framed? Whose interests do current framings serve? We unpack this in more 
detail further below.
Empirically, future research will have to develop a protocol for identifying classes 
of socio-technical energy practice as path-breaking sustainability niches. 
Research will then identify initiatives where these practices are developed (this 
could be within a country or regionally). A mixture of survey work (e.g. web-
based where practicable) and in-depth case study can interrogate networking 
between initiatives, the roles of intermediaries, and the political/social movement 
performance of the niche. Our core analytical concerns are for niche building 
processes, evidence of niche influence on institutions, and thus the momentum 
building behind these alternative sustainability pathways under different contexts.
Our recent research on low-carbon innovation in India and China shows how 
important these contexts are – with respect to particular low-carbon technologies 
as well as national circumstances (Ockwell et al. 2008; Watson et al. 2011). 
A future priority is therefore to understand how these processes of innovation 
and the barriers to innovation differ in other developing countries, particularly in 
countries that are less developed than China or India.
Of course, it is important to remember that the MLP framework is also interested 
in the way incumbent regimes become unsettled, and thus more susceptible 
to transformations and transitions. This too has to be part of a future research 
agenda for sustainable energy and low-carbon development pathways. Strong 
policy and business commitments to grid-extension pathways for energy have 
already been mentioned, and research in this vein would look to the kinds of 
regime this is constituting, and the possibilities this opens up for larger-scale low-
carbon energy practices, as well as any difficulties this might present for the co-
existence of decentralised solutions. 
15 http://www.inti.gob.ar/sc92/inti7.php
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8.2 Regime-level research
The research agenda proposed above tends to dwell on niche-building since it is 
interested in alternative low-carbon development pathways. However, care needs 
to be taken that this is not to the neglect of regime processes. Bearing in mind the 
extent of high-carbon regimes, we can expect – indeed we already experience – 
enormous strategic and tactical efforts to resist serious moves towards low-carbon 
infrastructure and socio-technical practices, underlining the need to incorporate 
a better understanding of the political economy of transitions and where and how 
powerful support for low-carbon pathways might be mobilised. 
Included in regime process considerations have to be wider developments that 
underpin energy developments, such as industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
development of new livelihoods and lifestyles. How these unfold is intimately 
related to energy demands and forms of provision. 
A focus at the regime level also draws attention back to issues of political economy. 
In line with a pathways approach, analysis is required to deconstruct existing 
policy narratives around low-carbon development and unpick whose interests 
these narratives serve. With the attention given to the idea of technology needs 
under the UNFCCC process, analysis of how these needs are framed and whose 
needs existing policy approaches serve could make an important contribution to 
understanding how policy might be reframed to better serve the needs of different 
communities in different developing countries. As noted above, there are likely 
to be important differences between less developed countries and emerging 
economies such as China and India with respect to these issues.
Particular emphasis needs to be given to understanding the context-specificities 
that define these needs, and to appraisal processes which facilitate reflexive 
expression of their subjective constructions in different places, by different people 
at different times. Such reflexive appraisal holds greater promise of facilitating 
policy approaches that are sensitive to the characteristics of existing socio-
technical regimes and therefore to introduce new technologies and practices that 
have maximum chance of being accepted into, and therefore ultimately transform, 
existing everyday practices. 
At a broader level, attention needs to be given to how existing policy discourses 
construct the idea of ‘low-carbon development’ and the extent to which this attends 
to multiple different constructions of development. Again, attending to alternative 
possible framings of technology needs, together with a broader understanding of 
the socio-technical nature of technology related practices provides a useful point 
of departure. It points research towards questioning dominant policy discourses, 
such as the hegemonic technology financing discourse, and examining concrete 
case studies of technology transfer and provision of energy services more broadly, 
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in order to unpick which conceptions of development these currently serve, which 
aspects are not served, whose interests this benefits, what narratives serve these 
interests and how these narratives might be reframed to meet different, or broader 
development needs in future. Questions such as to what extent technology 
transfer policies serve the needs of poor and marginalised communities, least 
developed countries or emerging economies, need to be asked and approached 
in a more disaggregated, context-specific way than existing policy discussions 
and mechanisms facilitate. The broader question of what exactly a construction 
of technology transfer and development as pro-poor actually looks like also needs 
to be unpacked in more detail (see Urban and Sumner 2009 for a useful starting 
point).
Such critical analysis and more detailed deconstruction of current framings and 
narratives on technology transfer and low-carbon development may also identify 
areas of complementarity, providing purchase for reframing existing narratives to 
better serve a broader range of interests and technology needs. These synergies 
might be usefully brokered via a promotion of a better understanding of the role of 
indigenous innovation capabilities in both underpinning industrial development in 
developing countries at the same time as facilitating faster diffusion of low-carbon 
technologies, thus dissolving entrenched tensions between industrialised and 
developing countries within international climate change negotiations.
Furthermore, this analysis can take into account the interactions between the 
low-carbon agenda and other related issues that remain important for developing 
countries. These include the challenge of improving energy access (particularly 
in rural areas), and on-going debates about the extent to which energy sector 
reforms are desirable or required to meet this and other challenges.
8.3 Mapping and building indigenous innovation capabilities
Work is also necessary to better map the level of existing indigenous innovation 
capabilities across a range of different technological areas. Effective transfer of 
existing technologies requires detailed understanding of what capabilities already 
exist, where they exist and why. Understanding the nature and location of existing 
absorptive capacities would enable focussed targeting both of new capacity 
building activities that address areas of need, and focussed targeting of flows of 
technologies in areas of relevant existing capacities making adoption more likely 
within these new contexts. Particular attention also needs to be given to whether, 
where and how projects funded by existing policy mechanisms have contributed 
to broader capacity building and what can be learnt in order to reorient policy to 
more explicitly foster new capacities in future. Additional empirical work exploring 
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barriers to, and successful examples of, technology transfer and capacity building 
across a range of different contexts is also essential to inform the architecture 
and emphasis of future policy approaches. At a theoretical level, it would also 
be useful to articulate a more coherent, empirically informed theory of the role 
of innovation capabilities specifically in relation to low-carbon technological 
transitions within different developing country contexts, and to articulate such 
a theoretical framework in terms that can be easily understood and applied in 
policy and practice. This work is particularly timely given on-going discussions 
on new policy approaches to low-carbon technology transfer and development 
within a post-2012 international climate policy framework – and the need for this 
framework to learn from previous and existing international initiatives designed to 
foster low-carbon innovation.
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9 Conclusions – ways forward
This paper has covered considerable ground. It began by noting how relationships 
between energy and development operate across increasingly diverse settings. 
What many share in common, either now or in the future, is interest in drastically 
reducing the carbon emissions of powering development, and improving access 
to energy services amongst the poor. At the international level, we noted how this 
has often been reduced to the challenge of financing and facilitating the transfer 
of appropriate technologies. This largely remains the case in UNFCCC climate 
regime negotiations.
But this is only one way of ‘framing’ energy pathways in low-carbon development. 
This paper has gone to considerable lengths, and drawn upon a long tradition 
of research, in order to indicate how the long-term process of accumulating 
innovation capabilities in poorer countries and communities differs from financing 
‘technology transfer’ projects. Another useful insight from the literature on technical 
change in developing countries is the significance political economies have for 
learning processes, the mobilisation of resources and the institutionalisation of 
new development pathways. The whole notion of technology being transferred 
and embedded as a package into a conforming recipient context begins to 
look problematic. Instead, we have to begin to think of local socio-technical 
experimentation contributing to the development of niches, and which in turn offer 
alternative development pathways compared to those underpinned by existing 
energy socio-technical regimes.
If we are to make progress in achieving pro-poor low-carbon development, we 
need to develop robust analysis that can understand and explain the kinds of 
complex interactions we have discussed. We have suggested that a broad framing 
of the issues, that sees the challenge as one of wide-scale, path-breaking socio-
technical transformation, needs to be accompanied by a variety of concepts. 
Transition and niche theories suggest that policy interventions need to be long-
standing, but also that there needs to be learning from experimentation and that 
learning should contribute to the widespread cultivation of relevant knowledge. 
Broad networks of actors engage in such experiments and carry such knowledge, 
helping to institutionalise new socio-technical practices and provide constituencies 
that challenge incumbents. Resources are needed to create protected spaces 
in which new practices can develop and learning can take place. Coordinating 
actors – system-builders – are needed to manage the networks and facilitate 
exchange of information and learning. The participation of users is important to 
realise the legitimacy and enrich the knowledge informing any favoured niches 
and trajectories in particular contexts.
Drawing on the research agenda set out in section 8 of this paper, the following 
priority areas are proposed for future STEPS research. The three priorities outlined 
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here are not designed to be exhaustive, but are particularly important areas in 
which STEPS can make a distinctive contribution to the literature, and to policy 
and practice. Amongst the important drivers for these particular priorities are the 
opportunities STEPS has to bring its perspective to international processes (e.g. 
the UNFCCC climate change talks and the Rio + 20 conference in 2012) and to 
national and local policies and strategies within developing countries.
1. There is a clear need for more systematic evaluation and learning of multilateral 
funds and mechanisms that are designed to foster low-carbon innovation in 
developing countries. Examples include the Global Environment Facility, the 
Clean Development Mechanism and the more recent World Bank Climate 
Investment Funds. Given the establishment of the new Technology Mechanism 
and Green Climate Fund under the UNFCCC, and the large number of other 
public and private sector initiatives that exist, learning from current and past 
mechanisms is important. It is not only important to understand ‘what works’ in 
delivering low-carbon development (and particularly innovation capabilities). It 
is also essential from a STEPS perspective to gain a better understanding of 
which low-carbon development pathways are favoured by these mechanisms, 
and which interests benefit (or not) from them.
2. This paper’s broad framing of low-carbon development suggests that this 
particular issue needs to be connected to other ‘regime level’ agendas that 
continue to be important for the provision of energy services in developing 
countries. The improvement of energy access for citizens of developing 
countries has been the subject of considerable policy and practitioner attention 
for several decades. Related to this, there has been a controversial debate 
about the extent to which the reform of utility sectors (e.g. through privatisation 
and/or liberalisation) is an appropriate way to improve the financial performance 
of these sectors and their ability to improve energy access. There are also 
links to other policy domains such as industrial and trade policies. The analysis 
of low-carbon development sometimes takes too little account of these pre-
existing challenges. It is therefore important that such links are made, and new 
research focuses on how the low-carbon agenda interacts with them.
3. This paper’s analysis of the development of low-carbon technological capabilities 
has emphasised the importance of context. Whilst recent work by the Sussex 
Energy Group has added much needed empirical evidence from India and 
China to policy debates, it is hazardous to draw significant conclusions from 
this evidence for other developing countries. This is particularly the case with 
respect to less developed countries, where the challenges of building relevant 
capabilities are different and arguably greater. Future research therefore needs 
to gather new evidence in less developed country contexts to better understand 
how different their challenges are – and the extent to which the evidence leads 
to different implications for national and international policy.
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Annex A: Energy access and carbon 
emissions in the developing world
In terms of energy issues in development, increasing access is the overriding 
concern of many developing countries. We can consider their current energy 
situation in a number of ways. There is the absolute level of energy-use and 
the level of access to different energy carriers. Figure 10 shows a map of the 
world with electricity consumption by region or continent. It is clear that there are 
considerable differences in the consumption of electricity between industrialised 
countries and the developing world. But there are also differences between 
developing countries. If we were to examine each of the continents more closely, 
we would also see large disparities within them, and within each country between 
rural and urban areas. Africa stands out most starkly as the lowest consumer of 
electricity and when we contrast this with biomass consumption (see Figure 11) 
the picture is almost completely reversed.
Table 1 and Table 2 give absolute numbers to these basic pictures.
Figure 10: Electricity consumption by continent or region (kWh/capita).
Source: IEA (2010) 
These figures and tables give a snapshot of the energy situation in developing 
countries. We can also examine the situation over time to see what trends, if any, 
are discernable. Figure 12 shows developed and developing countries divided 
into four income groups and their average energy-use per capita. As we might 
expect, the ranking of the groups by income and by energy-use per capita is the 
same. The disparity between the high-income group and the others is clear and is 
about ten times higher compared with the low-income group in particular.
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Figure 11: Percentage of households using traditional biomass fuel by country.
Adapted from: Gordon et al. (2004) cited in Modi et al. (2005:12)
Households using biomass fuel (%)
      <50     70-80           >90
   50-70     80-90     No data
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Table 1: Electricity access in 2008 by region
Country or region
Population 
without 
electricity
millions
Electrification 
rate
%
Urban
electrification 
rate
%
Rural
electrification 
rate
%
Africa 589 40.0 66.8 22.7
North Africa 2 98.9 99.6 98.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 587 28.5 57.5 11.9
Developing Asia 809 77.2 93.5 67.2
China & East Asia 195 90.2 96.2 85.5
South Asia 614 60.2 88.4 48.4
Latin America 34 92.7 98.7 70.2
Middle East 21 89.1 98.5 70.6
Developing 
countries
1,453 72.0 90.0 58.4
Transition 
economies & 
OECD
3 99.8 100.0 99.5
World 1,456 78.2 93.4 63.2
Source: WEO (2008)
Households using biomass fuel (%)
      <50     70-80           >90
   50-70     80-90     No data
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Table 2: Number of people relying on traditional biomass for cooking and heating 
in developing countries in 2000    
Country or region Million Percent of total population
China 706 56
Indonesia 155 74
Rest of Asia 137 37
India 585 58
Rest of South Asia 128 41
Latin America 96 23
North Africa/Middle East 8 0.05
sub-Saharan Africa 575 89
Total, Developing Countries 2390 52
Source: IEA (2002) cited in Modi et al. (2005:13)
Figure 12: Energy use per capita by income group.
Source: WDI (2009)
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Similarly to the energy-use per capita disparities, carbon dioxide emissions continue to be highest 
on average among people in the rich countries (see Figure 12). In fact, the disparity here is even 
larger at over twenty times the average CO2 emissions of those in the poorest countries. The 
aggregate emissions, however, show a closing of this difference, except in the poorest countries 
(see Figure 14). We can see that emissions from the richest countries have continued to grow but 
they are being approached rapidly by those countries in the lower middle-income group. 
 
 
Figure 7: Energy use per capita by income group. 
Source: WDI (2009) 
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From the perspective of preventing dangerous climate change, of course, these trends are 
worrying. Indeed, they may be even more so when we consider the intensity of CO2 emissions. 
Despite general trends worldwide towards lower energy-intensity of GDP (see Figure 15), the 
 
Figure 8: Carbon dioxide emissions per capita by income group. 
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Similarly to the energy-use per capita disparities, carbon dioxide emissions 
continue to be highest on average among people in the rich countries (see Figure 
12). In fact, the disparity here is even larger at over twenty times the average CO2 
emissions of those in the poorest countries. The aggregate emissions, however, 
show a closing of this difference, except in the poorest countries (see Figure 14). 
We can see that emissions from the richest countries have continued to grow but 
they are being approached rapidly by those countries in the lower middle-income 
group.
Figure 13: Carbon dioxide emissions per capita by income group. 
Source: WDI (2009)
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From the perspective of preventing dangerous climate change, of course, these trends are 
worrying. Indeed, they may be even more so when we consider the intensity of CO2 emissions. 
Despite general trends worldwide towards lower energy-intensity of GDP (see Figure 15), the 
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Figure 14: Total carbon dioxide emissions by income group.
Source: WDI (2009)
From the perspective of preventing dangerous climate change, of course, these 
trends are worrying. Indeed, they may be even more so when we consider the 
intensity of CO2 emissions. Despite general trends worldwide towards lower 
energy-intensity of GDP (see Figure 15), the carbon dioxide emissions of each 
unit of energy-use in the lower middle-income countries are increasing and are 
now the highest worldwide (see Figure 16).
Figure 15: Energy intensity by income group
Source: WDI (2009)
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Figure 8: Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy-use by income group. 
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Figure 16: Carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy-use by income group. 
Source: WDI (2009)
It is clear that the levels of access to energy, and its consumption, are highly 
uneven across the world. Within this broad picture there are further disparities 
among developing countries, with the poorest countries at very low levels on both 
per-capita and aggregate measures. There is also an important issue of energy 
quality that is, again, most stark among the poorest countries where the vast 
majority of households continue to rely on traditional biomass. The most serious 
implications of this reliance are on human health, and the consequences for the 
local environment and global climate change. The burning of traditional biomass 
in the household is understood to cause severe eye and respiratory problems; the 
latter resulting in the “premature death” of 1.3 million people each year, more than 
half of which are children under five years old (OECD-IEA 2008). Depending on 
the particularities of the local environment, and practices of biomass collection, 
there can be serious deforestation that causes further degrading of the local 
environment, which in turn drives local people (usually women and children) to 
search longer and wider for biomass. If the burning of biomass is not part of a 
neutral carbon cycle then there will be net CO2 emissions that increase the risk of 
dangerous climate change globally, with impacts on the local environment as well.
In terms of the links between energy-use and carbon emissions worldwide, there 
are important trends emerging among the lower middle income countries. While 
their emissions are lower than the rich countries on per capita and aggregate 
levels, they are rising quickly on both counts. Indeed, as a group, they are on 
a trend of increasing CO2 emissions per unit of energy-use even if their energy 
intensity of GDP is falling. This suggests that the economies of the lower middle 
income group are actually carbonising rather than decarbonising.
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Classification of countries as used in the figures in Annex A
Table 3: Low Income (43 countries)
Afghanistan Guinea-Bissau Rwanda
Bangladesh Haiti Senegal
Benin Kenya Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso Korea, Dem. Rep. Somalia
Burundi Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan
Cambodia Lao PDR Tanzania
Central African Republic Liberia Togo
Chad Madagascar Uganda
Comoros Malawi Uzbekistan
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Vietnam
Eritrea Mauritania Yemen, Rep.
Ethiopia Mozambique Zambia
Gambia, The Myanmar Zimbabwe
Ghana Nepal
Guinea Niger
Table 4: Lower Middle Income (55 countries)
Albania Honduras Paraguay
Angola India Philippines
Armenia Indonesia Samoa
Azerbaijan Iran, Islamic Rep Sao Tome and Principe
Belize Iraq Solomon Islands
Bhutan Jordan Sri Lanka
Bolivia Kiribati Sudan
Cameroon Kosovo Swaziland
Cape Verde Lesotho Syrian Arab Republic
China Maldives Thailand
Congo, Rep Marshall Islands Timor-Leste
Cote d’Ivoire Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Tonga
Djibouti Moldova Tunisia
Ecuador Mongolia Turkmenistan
Egypt, Arab Rep Morocco Ukraine
El Salvador Nicaragua Vanuatu
Georgia Nigeria West Bank and Gaza
Guatemala Pakistan 
Guyana Papua New Guinea
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Table 5: Upper Middle Income (46 countries)
Algeria Grenada Peru
American Samoa Jamaica Poland
Argentina Kazakhstan Romania
Belarus Latvia Russian Federation
Bosnia and Herzegovina Lebanon Serbia
Botswana Libya Seychelles
Brazil Lithuania South Africa
Bulgaria Macedonia, FYR St. Kitts and Nevis
Chile Malaysia St. Lucia
Colombia Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Costa Rica Mayotte Suriname
Cuba Mexico Turkey
Dominica Montenegro Uruguay
Dominican Republic Namibia Venezuela, RB
Fiji Palau
Gabon Panama 
Table 6: High Income (66 countries)
Andorra France Netherlands Antilles
Antigua and Barbuda French Polynesia New Caledonia
Aruba Germany New Zealand
Australia Greece Northern Mariana Islands
Austria Greenland Norway
Bahamas, The Guam Oman
Bahrain Hong Kong SAR, China Portugal
Barbados Hungary Puerto Rico
Belgium Iceland Qatar
Bermuda Ireland San Marino
Brunei Darussalam Isle of Man Saudi Arabia
Canada Israel Singapore
Cayman Islands Italy Slovak Republic
Channel Islands Japan Slovenia
Croatia Korea, Rep. Spain
Cyprus Kuwait Sweden
Czech Republic Liechtenstein Switzerland
Denmark Luxembourg Trinidad and Tobago
Equatorial Guinea Macao SAR, China United Arab Emirates
Estonia Malta United Kingdom
Faeroe Islands Monaco United States
Finland Netherlands Virgin Islands (U.S.)
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Annex B: A brief history of international 
policy towards energy and development
Technology has long been seen as an important factor of development. Early 
theorising identified industrialisation as essential to economic growth in 
developing countries and therefore saw access to technology as central to the 
success of the development process. Whether the overall development strategy 
was based on import substitution or industrialisation by invitation, the importance 
of using efficient production technologies was the same (Hunt 1989; Oman and 
Wignaraja 1991). Such technologies, it was assumed, were those designed 
and manufactured in the industrialised economies and so it was from here that 
technology needed to be ‘transferred’ to the developing economies. Furthermore, 
it was thought, developing countries could be ‘spared’ the cost of innovating to 
create these technologies, while enjoying the benefits (Bell and Pavitt 1993; 
Radošević 1999). 
In line with this thinking, from 1948 the ILO and UNESCO began supporting teams 
of experts to provide technical assistance to developing countries (Shah 2009). 
However, mainstream economic theorising viewed technology as an exogenous 
factor – a given – and so understood ‘technology transfer’ as predominantly 
an event rather than a process. As such, technology could be purchased by a 
developing-country firm, which could be trained how to use it, and then be ready 
to compete with all other firms that also had the same equipment (Bell 2009). 
From this perspective, the only difficulty regarding technology was to finance its 
purchase. Therefore, as the development endeavour gathered pace during the 
post World War II period, the financing of technology became an important focus 
of attention, whether through the private sector or through the interventions of 
bilateral and multilateral donors. Developing countries needed technology and 
industrialised countries lent the money through ‘aid’ to finance that technology. 
As Robb (2004: 21) notes, this was clearly “a manifestation of inequality” and, 
moreover, with the Cold War as a motivator of interventions in many parts of 
the world, the offering or withholding of aid – both from the West and the East – 
became a tool of foreign policy.
It is not surprising then that ‘technology transfer’ became highly politicised; an 
object of power relations between the industrialised and developing worlds (Robb 
2004; Shah 2009). Initially, however, there was a long period of optimism about 
the role of science and technology – particularly science – in development. This 
was rooted in what Standke (2006: 641) describes as a 20-year period after WWII 
of “euphoria for science in the developed countries”; the period culminating in 
the first specialised science and technology conference organised by UNESCO 
in Geneva in 1963. Out of that conference the Committee on Science and 
Technology for Development (CSTD), the Advisory Committee on the Application 
of Science and Technology for Development (ACAST), and the Office of Science 
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and Technology (OST) within the UN Secretariat were created (UNCTAD 2003). 
But this “techno-optimism” began to turn more critical with the confluence of a 
number of factors (Shah 2009: 8-9). The G77 group of developing countries was 
formed in 1964, increasing their bargaining power within the UN system (G77 
2010); various forms of dependency theory were being posited to explain the 
uneven record of development, or underdevelopment, (Hunt 1989: 67-68); there 
was a general questioning of the assumptions of ‘standard’ economic-growth 
models, particularly in the light of debates following publication of The Limits 
to Growth (1971); a wave of environmental awareness began to emerge that 
helped, among other factors, to stimulate organisation of the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Najam and Cleveland 2003); and 
critiques of ‘technology transfer’ to developing countries were articulated in the 
‘Sussex Manifesto’ (1970), as well as Small is Beautiful (1973) (which helped to 
inspire the growth of the Appropriate Technology movement) (Carr 1985; Smith 
2005). Perhaps the most radical development was the attempt by the G77 to 
demand a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (which, among other things, 
sought better terms of technology transfer), spurred by a temporary rise in the 
group’s power (and confidence – see Bhagwati 1986, particularly page 769) 
following the 1973 oil-price shocks and changes in other economic and political 
conditions (Geldart and Lyon 1980: 91-94).
So, by the time of the second conference on science and technology – the UN 
Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), held in 
Vienna in 1979 – the political landscape had changed significantly. Amid increased 
North-South tensions in regard to the NIEO – towards the establishment of which 
UNCSTD was intended to contribute (Standke 2006: 637) – the conference 
was “not about transferring technology but [about] asserting equitable access” 
to technology (Shah 2009: 13). Bearing in mind that the agreed plan of action 
was not supported by any serious financial commitments, and that attempts 
to manoeuvre science and technology expertise to the UN in New York were 
both unsuccessful and precipitated a weakening of UNESCO’s position as the 
pre-eminent source of science and technology expertise within the UN system, 
Standke (2006: 637-639) judges the conference to have been a failure. Indeed, 
subsequent UN conferences that related either to science and technology or, 
more directly relevant to our interest in this paper, those concerned with energy, 
environment and development could be seen largely as failures. But this may 
be a simplistic interpretation. Certainly, there are some who argue that there is 
reason to be cautiously optimistic (see, for example, Najam and Cleveland 2003). 
Still, we will not assess here whether these were successes or failures. Instead, 
we believe they illustrate how enduring are the themes of discussion between 
industrialised and developing countries concerning ‘technology transfer’ since the 
Vienna conference: the ‘rate’ and financing of transfer, and the issue of property 
rights.
In 1981 the UN held a conference in Nairobi specifically on energy – the 
Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy – and the intended 
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transition away from fossil-fuel energy carriers (El-Hinnawi et al. 1983). For many 
developing countries this was an urgent issue as they were suffering severe 
economic problems as a result of high oil prices (notwithstanding those countries 
that were benefiting from increased prices for commodities and/or were exporting 
oil). The conference took place in the context of a new administration in the US, 
under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, which began to vigorously pursue the 
neo-liberal economic agenda already guiding others elsewhere (Harvey 2005). 
But, according to Bhagwati (1986: 769), developing countries were still in general 
pursuing the broad NIEO agenda “that put them in a confrontational posture with 
the developed countries”. Certainly, there was little agreement over the terms 
of ‘technology transfer’, even if there was agreement that it needed to happen. 
According to the summary provided by Biswas (1983: 125):
“Most delegations stressed the importance of technology transfer and 
adaptation in harnessing the potential of new and renewable energy in 
developing countries.
The representatives of the developed market economy countries 
emphasized the important role of the private sector in this process. 
However, most of the representatives of developing countries stressed 
their need to have access to technology on reasonable and equitable 
terms, and considered that developed countries, where most modern 
technology originated, had a special obligation and responsibility in 
respect of such transfers.
Uruguay reminded the Conference that technological advances in energy 
conversion are the result of huge efforts. Therefore it is very difficult if 
not impossible that they be given away free to others. France questioned 
whether the industrialized countries were ready to break the near monopoly 
that they enjoy over advanced technologies in the energy field.”
Two further quotes following the conference give a flavour of the disappointments 
felt by some regarding the outcome. Norman (1981: 1235) comments that the 
failure to agree on how to finance and implement the Nairobi Programme of 
Action (something that was agreed):
“… was entirely predictable. The United States delegation, together 
with a few others from industrialized countries, went to Nairobi with 
instructions to oppose the creation of any new institution or international 
fund … Delegates from Third World countries generally argued that new 
arrangements are needed to channel funds into the development of 
renewable energy resources in the developing world.”
And, an editorial in the Times (1981) comments:
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“The Nairobi Conference … reviewed a range of renewable energy 
sources which the Third World might be able to exploit. …
However, the nations of the South remain sceptical, partly because the 
North continues to talk of technology ‘appropriate’ to the South, leaving 
the impression that sophisticated technology is not appropriate to peasant 
cultures based on the wood stove and the bullock cart, which is often 
true. But there is also the failure of the advanced nations to devise ways 
in which the development of energy resources in the Third World can be 
effectively financed. …
The Reagan Administration, however, believes that the exploration and 
development of new energy sources in the Third World should be left 
to private enterprises and not taken over by bureaucratic international 
agencies. As a result, the energy affiliate [of the World Bank] is, for the 
time being, no longer under serious consideration. This is a pity because 
the big multinational companies may not feel it worth their while to explore 
for new energy sources in poorer countries where any additional energy 
discovered may add only marginally to the total resources at the command 
of the company.”
So, no special fund or new institution was formed out of the 1981 conference 
to help developing countries increase access to ‘new and renewable energy’ 
technologies. Nevertheless, the World Bank and UNDP had already begun 
energy assessments for developing countries, starting in 1980 through the 
Energy Assessment Programme (EAP). In 1983 the Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Programme (ESMAP) was created by the same institutions, subsuming 
the EAP, in order to “move from studies to actions” (Thalwitz et al. 1990: 1-2, 
emphasis in original). Based within the World Bank, ESMAP was conceived as 
a technical unit that would go beyond the investment recommendations given in 
the EAP reports to “more detailed pre-investment studies leading eventually to 
investment opportunities which the donor community could support” (Thalwitz et 
al. 1990: 2). The activities of ESMAP during the 1990s began to include more pro-
active engagements such as testing particular types of equipment, developing 
new products, and experimenting with finance models (see, for example, the 
work done in Kenya in the late 1990s, reported in: Ochieng et al. 1999; Hankins 
and van der Plas 2000; EAA 2001). More recently it has provided assistance to 
develop policy for rural electrification and renewable energy, and conduct energy-
stakeholder workshops in developing countries (Wang 2004). But its expenditure 
is small: total disbursements for the financial year 2009 were just under USD 15 
million (ESMAP 2009).
Other, more substantial, funds and institutions have been created since ESMAP. 
In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
was ratified; a process that had been initiated ten years earlier in Vienna (MLF 
2010). In 1990, the Multilateral Fund (MLF) was established as an “inducement 
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to participation by developing countries” (UNEP 2002:13), intended to help them 
“cover the incremental costs of complying with the Protocol’s provisions” (Luken 
and Grof 2006: 244). This followed recognition in the 1989 Helsinki Declaration 
that CFC-substitute technologies needed to be transferred to developing countries 
urgently. Developing countries, in similar vein to discussions at the 1981 Nairobi 
conference, “vehemently demanded that transfer of technology be conducted on 
a free or non-commercial basis” while industrialised countries were concerned for 
the protection of intellectual property rights so as not to “undermine the incentives 
for research and development in environmental technologies” (Ling 1992: 115-
116). The compromise achieved was the acceptance of paying incremental costs. 
To date, the MLF has disbursed over USD 2.34 billion through more than 6000 
projects in 147 developing countries (MLF 2010), and ozone-depleting chemical 
emissions have been reduced globally by 95% (Green 2009). Furthermore, the 
Montreal Protocol and subsequent amendments established the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, as well as providing a successful 
example of the application of the ‘precautionary principle’ (Green 2009: 259), 
achievements that led Mostafa Tolba (Executive Director of UNEP) to describe it 
as “a precedent-setting bargain” (quoted in Ling 1992: 97-98).
The Montreal Protocol was, of course, focused on a particular issue – the 
protection of the ozone layer – and was able to discuss solutions concerning 
discontinued use and replacement of particular technologies. The UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 
however, was concerned with the fundamental connections and tensions 
between the development process and the environment in general. Although 
considered a failure by some, it is credited with at least raising the profile to global 
recognition of the environment and development relationship and the concept of 
‘sustainable development’ (Najam and Cleveland 2003; Shah 2009). In addition 
to the official output of the summit – Agenda 21, the Authoritative Statement on 
Forest Principles, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
– the Global Environment Facility (GEF) rules were ‘agreed’, and both the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Convention on 
Biological Diversity (UNCBD) were established (Najam and Cleveland 2003). The 
GEF was intended to provide the finance for implementing Agenda 21, estimated 
to be USD 625 billion per year at the time, of which the industrialised countries 
would supply USD 125 billion through the GEF (UNEP 2007).
But the GEF was a controversial idea from the outset, particularly over the 
governance of the fund (Porter and Brown 1996: 141; Young 2002: 64). In 
essence, the industrialised countries wanted the GEF housed and governed within 
the World Bank and its structures, while the developing countries wanted a new 
institution governed along the lines of the UN General Assembly. The difference 
between the two forms is clear: the donor countries would have significant 
control if the fund were structured similarly to the World Bank; the developing 
countries would have significant influence within a UN-like structure (Porter and 
Brown 1996). Eventually, developing countries were persuaded to agree to the 
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GEF under the World Bank, but only after donors promised a review of the first 
period of operation, and a realisation that it was the best outcome the developing 
countries were likely to get. As Young (2002: 67) observes, “the main priorities 
of most Southern governments at Rio were reduced to simply maximising aid 
flows and technology transfer as far as possible”. However, in 1994, agreement 
was achieved to restructure the GEF, including a governing council of 32 states 
(14 industrialised-country, 16 developing-country, and 2 from the transition 
economies) and the secretariat made “functionally independent of the [World] 
Bank” (Porter and Brown 1996: 145). Nevertheless, it remains controversial 
(Young 2002), and the finance actually disbursed has been “extremely modest in 
relation to the environmental challenges it addresses” (Porter and Brown 1996: 
141). There are different estimates of the level of finances, but the three-year pilot 
phase saw between USD 730 million and USD 1.2 billion allocated, rising to USD 
2 billion over the next three-year phase and USD 2.75 billion for the next period 
(Osborn and Bigg 1998: 112; Porter and Brown 1996: 142; Young 2002: 133). In 
terms of finance associated directly with the climate change remit of the GEF, the 
estimate is USD 1.4 billion in total up to 2002 (Ellis et al. 2007: 18). Whatever the 
precise figures, and whatever the level of arrears from various donors (Young 
2002), these amounts were considerably smaller than the USD 125 billion per 
year that the industrialised economies were to provide.
More successful in terms of mobilising finance has been the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. Disch (2010: 51) cites estimates of the 
value of carbon emissions reductions for 2007 alone as USD 7.4 billion, and the 
number of new projects has continued to grow rapidly. The CDM was created 
late in the process of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations following suggestions from 
Brazil for a Green Development Fund (an idea supported by the G77 and China 
but rejected by the industrialised countries), and the US for a market mechanism 
of emissions trading (Matsuo 2003). Finally agreed within the Protocol was a 
combination/compromise between the two proposals that was expected to 
simultaneously promote sustainable development while assisting industrialised 
countries to meet their Kyoto commitments (Lecocq and Ambrosi 2007: 134-
135). Hailed as a “win-win” agreement by both the industrialised and developing 
countries (Matsuo 2003), the CDM nevertheless continues to attract criticism over 
a number of aspects. Among others, these include the fear that it will result in 
carbon ‘leakage’, and that it (Clémençon 2008: 85):
“… allows developed country investors to accumulate carbon reduction 
credits cheaply by “picking the low hanging fruits” in developing countries 
and selling emission credits for big profits.”
Although the CDM appears to be a credible and acceptable solution to the long-
standing argument between the industrialised countries and the developing world 
over technology and finance (and could even be claimed as something of a 
victory for the developing world, considering that it has not had to commit to GHG 
reductions), the issue has not gone away. As Ockwell et al. (2008: 4104) observe:
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“How to achieve low carbon technology transfer … continues to represent 
a contentious issue, which came close to derailing a major part of the 
negotiations at the 13th Convention of the Parties … in Bali 2007.”
The incident referred to concerns an intervention on the final Saturday morning 
by India and China that successfully changed Article 1(b)(ii) so that the emphasis 
of “measurable, reportable and verifiable” was placed on “technology, financing 
and capacity-building” rather than “nationally appropriate mitigation actions by 
developing country Parties” (Clémençon 2008: 76). As Clémençon notes, the 
differences between the two forms of text are subtle, perhaps even irrelevant, but 
the fact that the intervention was made highlights the sensitivity of the issues of 
technology and finance in climate negotiations. Indeed, during the Copenhagen 
conference in December 2009, we saw the same issues raised again. Fears 
among developing countries about the Copenhagen Accord – the final Draft 
Decision16 of the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen – are substantially 
related to the possible weakening of industrialised-country obligations to finance 
technology transfer to the developing world (South Centre 2010). Notwithstanding 
these fears, the Accord does articulate a number of measures that had been in 
developing-country demands for many years: a separate fund (the Copenhagen 
Green Climate Fund); a “Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology 
development and transfer … guided by a country-driven approach”; and “goals” 
for mobilising significant finance (UNFCCC 2009: 3). The details are absent, and 
the language is generally weak, but it represents a shift of some significance in 
the historical positions of the industrialised countries.
What this history reveals is just how long-standing have been some of the themes 
that bedevil current international climate change negotiations around low-carbon 
development: 
• conceiving (low-carbon) development as a matter of access to technology
• debating the terms of that access
• assuring returns on investment for technology developers
• trying to spread the benefits of those technologies
• the respective roles for the private sectors and public sector – states and 
markets
• the absence of a focus on learning and development over time.
16 Although the Accord is described as a “Draft Decision”, there are questions as to its 
status within the UNFCCC process. The Conference merely “took note” of the Accord and 
countries have been invited to “associate” themselves with it (Bodansky 2010; South Centre 
2010). By mid-2010, according to the US Climate Action Network (USCAN 2010), “119 
countries, including the 27-member EU, are likely to or have engaged with the accord, 
representing 83.30% of global emissions”, while “5 countries will not engage with the accord, 
representing 0.58% of global emissions”. There are reports that accuse the US of using 
threats of withholding climate finance from countries if they do not associate themselves 
with the Accord (Goldenberg 2010).
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